FIDUCIARY EXEMPTION FOR PUBLIC NECESSITY:
SHAREHOLDER PROFIT, PUBLIC GOOD, AND THE
HOBSON‟S CHOICE DURING A NATIONAL CRISIS
Robert J. Rhee†
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2008 has posed innumerable problems in law,
policy, and economics. A key event in the history of the financial crisis was
Bank of America‟s acquisition of Merrill Lynch. Along with the fire sale of
Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the rescue of Merrill
Lynch confirmed the worst fears about the financial crisis. Before this
acquisition, Bank of America had long desired a top tier investment
banking business, and Merrill Lynch represented a strategic opportunity to
acquire a troubled but premier franchise of significant scale. 1 As the
financial markets continued to unravel after execution of the merger
agreement, this golden opportunity turned into a highly risky gamble.
Merrill Lynch was losing money at an astonishing rate, an event sufficient
for Bank of America to consider seriously invoking the merger agreement‟s
material adverse change clause.2 The deal ultimately closed, but only after
the government threatened to fire Bank of America‟s management and
board if the company attempted to terminate the deal. The government took
this coercive action to save the financial system from complete collapse.
The harm to the financial system from a broken deal, officials feared,
would have been unthinkable. The board‟s motivation is less clear. Like
many classic corporate law cases, the factors influencing the board and
management were complex.
This history serves as a contextualizing framework to analyze a
theoretical issue in corporate governance. Corporate governance is
generally considered a private activity. The business of the corporation is
†
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Bank of America formed from the acquisition of BankAmerica by NationsBank in 1998. NationsBank
was an aggressive, acquisitive bank under the leadership of Hugh McColl, whom Ken Lewis would
ultimately succeed as chief executive officer (“CEO”). Before the acquisition of BankAmerica,
NationsBank had sought an investment banking franchise, and following this strategy acquired in 1997
Montgomery Securities, a midsized San Francisco-based investment bank. Peter Truell, Nationsbank
Confirms a $1.2 Billion Deal for Montgomery, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at D5. The acquisition of
Merrill Lynch is a continuation of Bank of America‟s ambition in investment banking.
2
See infra Part I (describing the events surrounding the acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the testimonies
of key principals).
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managed or supervised by the board of directors; 3 shareholders and the
government typically react to the decisions of the management and the
board. 4 But this unique episode in American business history raises
important, novel questions that lie at the intersection of corporate
governance and public crisis management: (1) during a public crisis, should
the board have specific authority and discretion to advance the public
welfare at the direct cost of the shareholder wealth? (2) if so, what is the
nature and scope of its fiduciary duty?5 While the facts surrounding Bank of
America‟s acquisition of Merrill Lynch are unusual, they are not sui generis.
The analysis of these questions is important since, however infrequent,
there will always be national emergencies that entangle the government and
corporations in a complex relationship. Framed more broadly, these
questions continue, in the context of a global financial crisis, the debate on
the purpose of the corporation and the manager‟s duty to serve that end.6
This Article is written as two discrete, independently accessible
topical sections. The first topical section, presented in Part I of this Article,
is a case study of Bank of America‟s acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the
impact of a flawed merger execution on the board‟s subsequent decisions. I
provide this case study for two reasons. First, the human and economic
story is inherently interesting. I construct a narrative from various factual
sources, mostly congressional testimonies and U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings, and it tells a compelling tale of the
historic financial crisis. This history has inherent worth and scholarly
synthesis should preserve a factual account of these important events.
Second, a case study provides the empirical milieu of the complexity and
immediacy of the corporate decision making process and the enormity of
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DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 251(c) (2008) (requiring shareholder approval for merger or
consolidation); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(b) (requiring shareholder approval of amendment of
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5
Other episodes of the financial crisis of 2008 have already taught us lessons in corporate governance.
Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock recently provided a case study on JPMorgan Chase‟s acquisition of
Bear Stearns, wherein the authors concluded that the means used for the acquisition probably violated
Delaware law. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law:
Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 716-21 (2009).
Additionally, Delaware courts have already begun to decide cases related to the conduct of boards and
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6
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Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (corporate agents exercise power “only for the
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persistent controversy in corporate law.” William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A
Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2002).
4

2

the stakes involved during a national crisis.7 Based on this factual record, I
conclude that Bank of America failed to conduct proper due diligence and
overpaid for Merrill Lynch, calling into serious question whether its board
violated the duty of care. Unfortunately or fortunately, depending on the
perspective, the board did not have a sound contractual basis to invoke the
material adverse change clause in the merger agreement to terminate the
merger. Irrespective of a government threat, the board cannot be held liable
for failing to exercise a dubious legal option, the exercise of which would
have imperiled the company through legal liability and the financial market
through the injection of systemic risk.8
The second topical section, presented in Parts II through IV of this
Article, advances a theoretical basis for fiduciary exemption during a public
crisis. I make explicit a fundamental assumption running throughout this
Article: that is, the circumstances examined here is where a corporation is
uniquely situated to avert or mitigate a public crisis at a substantial private
cost to the firm, but where the cost-benefit calculation from a societal
perspective overwhelmingly weighs in favor of such action. This is the
essential nature of a public necessity.9 We saw the possibility, but not the
realization, of this situation when Bank of America appeared to be uniquely
situated to prevent a further meltdown of the capital markets by assuming
Merrill Lynch‟s breathtaking losses accruing in between signing of the
merger agreement and closing. Consider, then, the counterfactual: suppose
Bank of America‟s board did have a viable legal option to terminate the
acquisition, thereby the option to forego massive financial loss at the direct
cost of exacerbating a global financial crisis. Can the board harm
shareholders‟ economic interest when the corporation is uniquely situated
to promote the public good during a national crisis? One day in a different
set of facts arising from a public crisis, a board may confront this Hobson‟s
choice between maximizing shareholder profit and protecting the public
good.
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There are several shareholder derivative and federal securities actions involving the Bank of AmericaMerrill Lynch deal. See, e.g.., In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative & Employment Ret. Income Sec.
Act (ERISA) Litig., 258 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Bank of Am. Corp. Stockholder Derivative
Litig., Verified Consolidated Amended Derivative Complaint, C.A. NO. 4307-VCS (Del. Ch., May 8,
2009) [hereinafter “Derivative Complaint”]. See also In re Bank of Am. Corp. Stockholder Derivative
Litig., Motion to Dismiss, C.A. NO. 4307-VCS (Del. Ch., June 19, 2009) [hereinafter “Motion to
Dismiss”]. The analysis in this Article does not predict how these cases should be resolved. Important
facts, such as the adequacy of disclosure, can only be established through fact-finding or admission.
Rather, this episode is used as a contextualizing vehicle to discuss broader policy questions in corporate
law.
8
See infra Part II.A. (discussing why Bank of America could not legally terminate the merger with
Merrill Lynch under the merger agreement‟s material adverse effect clause).
9
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965) (stating that the public necessity doctrine allows one
to enter the property of another to avert an “imminent public disaster”).
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The Bank of America-Merrill Lynch episode serves as a
contextualizing vehicle to advance a theory of public necessity exemption
to fiduciary duty. A board‟s action to nationalize corporate governance and
purpose per public necessity is authorized by Delaware law, specifically
section 122(12) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”),
which thus far has received scant attention. This Article constructs around
this statute a framework for recognizing a fiduciary exemption based on the
board‟s determination that the firm, being uniquely situated to avert or
mitigate the public crisis, should provide aid. Simply stated, public
necessity, a well established concept borrowed from tort law, excuses the
destruction of private property (in the context here, not the destruction but
the transfer of assets to other parties or causes).10 When the board perceives
that the threat to the public welfare is great enough, the shareholder
primacy norm can and sometimes does fail the stress test of a crisis.
Part I presents the case study of the merger and analyzes the
fiduciary duty issues. Readers who are not interested in the factual details
and legal issues of the Bank of America-Merrill Lynch merger episode can
skip this Part without loss of essential context. Part II advances the idea of
fiduciary exemption, which is justified under a theory of public necessity.
Part III frames this theory in the broader context of the continuing debate
on shareholder primacy and corporate purpose. The Merrill Lynch
acquisition demonstrates the conditional limits of the shareholder primacy
norm. Shareholder primacy is best understood as a default norm serving as
a proxy for the normatively superior principle of social wealth and welfare
maximization. Part IV discusses the state-federal political aspect of
corporate governance and public crisis management. If state corporate law
undermines national crisis management policies, this Article argues, the
federal government could enact a fiduciary safe harbor; or perhaps more
aggressively it could enact a limited duty to assist government authority for
the boards of systemically or strategically-important corporations, such as
those belonging to the financial, energy, pharmaceutical, and technology
sectors, just to name a few.
I.

CASE STUDY OF THE MERRILL LYNCH ACQUISITION

In 2008, three major investment banks—Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, and Merrill Lynch—collapsed or were acquired under distress,
and these events played a large part in triggering the global financial
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See id. cmt. f (stating that the public necessity privilege includes the privilege to tear down or destroy
buildings, remove explosives or other dangerous articles, dig ditches, remove levees, or undertake any
other acts reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the privilege).
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crisis.11 In March, Bear Stearns had already agreed to be sold in a fire sale
to JPMorgan Chase.12 This sale was a harbinger of the worst to come. By
late summer, many of the largest, most important domestic and foreign
financial institutions faced extraordinary peril, including Citigroup and
American International Group (“AIG”), two of the largest American
financial institutions at the time. 13 On September 15, Lehman Brothers
announced its bankruptcy, and Bank of America (“the Bank”) and Merrill
Lynch (“Merrill”) announced their merger.14 If the fall of Bear Stearns was
the first major tremor in the financial markets, the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers triggered a seismic change from market disturbance to market
failure. The pending merger between the Bank and Merrill subsequently got
caught in this tectonic shift. Like everything else affected by the market
meltdown, the merger‟s fate faced great uncertainty and the events leading
to the ultimate closing of this landmark deal constitute a major episode of
the history of Wall Street and the financial crisis of 2008.
A.

Acquisition in Crisis

The merger proxy recounts the extraordinary circumstances under
which this acquisition was struck.15 On Saturday, September 13, Ken Lewis
and John Thain, the CEOs of the Bank and Merrill, respectively, met to
discuss a strategic relationship. 16 Thain proposed a 9.9 percent minority
investment in Merrill, but Lewis wanted a whole acquisition. 17 Lewis
11

See generally Robert J. Rhee, The Decline of Investment Banking: Preliminary Thoughts on the
Evolution of the Industry 19962008, 5 J. BUS. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the collapse
of the investment banking sector). At the time, there were only five full service, independent investment
banks left after the industry consolidation of the 1990s and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Id. The
banks were Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns. Id.
12
The purchase price was about $10 per share. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 716-21 (describing
the circumstances surrounding the deal). A year before, Bear Stearns shares traded at $170 per share.
Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas, Jr., JPMorgan Acts to Buy Ailing Bear Stearns at Huge
Discount, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A1.
13
See Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1
(describing the crisis and the troubles of financial institutions).
14
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2008, at A1.
15
BANK OF AM. CORP. & MERRILL LYNCH & CO., MERGER PROXY 49-51 (Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter
“MERGER PROXY”].
16
Id. at 49. Lewis has been the Bank‟s chief executive officer since 2001. During the period analyzed
here, mainly from September 2008 to January 2009, he was also the chairman of the board. On April 29,
2009, he was replaced by Walter Massey as chairman, though he remained a board member. Press
Release, Bank of Am., Bank of America Announces Results of Annual Meeting (Apr. 29, 2009). Thain
was appointed chief executive officer of Merrill in December 2007. He resigned from Merrill shortly
after the merger closed in January 2009. Julie Creswell & Louise Story, Merrill Lynch's leader gets the
ax, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan 23, 2009, at A1. Subsequently, Lewis also announced his early
resignation. See WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS
ON WALL STREET 109 (2009).
17
MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, at 49.
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quickly got his way, and they agreed on an acquisition. Due diligence
commenced that day and continued well into Sunday night.18 During these
frantic two days, the two parties negotiated the terms of the merger.19 The
deal was structured as a stock exchange with Merrill shareholders getting
0.8595 shares of the Bank‟s stock for each share of Merrill stock. 20 This
constituted a hefty 70 percent premium over the previous Friday‟s closing
share prices of the two companies,21 and valued Merrill at a multiple of 1.8x
tangible book value. 22 In late Sunday afternoon, the financial advisers
informed the Bank‟s board about the results of the due diligence and
provided their fairness opinions. 23 The boards of the two banks
unanimously approved the merger.24 The merger agreement was signed on
early Monday morning.25
The loss of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill—three of
only five full-service, independent investment banks remaining on Wall
Street at the time—in rapid succession was inconceivable only a few
months before. 26 By the time the Merrill acquisition was announced on
Monday, September 15, the stock market crash was well underway. The
S&P 500 index was down 24 percent from its October 2007 historic highs.27
A few weeks later, in October 2008, the equity market fell off the cliff and
the S&P 500 index was down 43 percent from the year before.28 The stock
market crash reflected broader economic problems such as the crash of the
housing market, severe disturbances in the credit markets, illiquidity
contagion among financial institutions, global recession, and increasing
unemployment.29 The most troubling and dangerous of these factors was a
liquidity crisis in the credit markets, including commercial paper, repo, and
18

Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 5.
21
Id. at 53. On September 12, 2008, the Bank‟s stock price closed at $33.74 and Merrill‟s stock closed
at $17.05, implying a deal value of $29 per share of Merrill stock. Id. at Letter to Shareholders.
Subsequently, on October 30, the Bank stock closed at $22.78 and Merrill‟s stock, which by this time
was closely pegged to the Bank‟s stock price, was $17.78. Id. at 8.
22
Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch, Creating Unique Financial Services Firm, Bank of America
Press
Release
(Sept.
15,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ml.com/?id=7695_7696_8149_88278_106886_108117.
23
Merger Proxy, supra note 15, at 51.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
See generally Rhee, supra note 11 (discussing the demise of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and
Merrill Lynch, and generally the problems independent investment banks confronted during the
financial crisis).
27
On October 9, 2007, the S&P 500 closed at 1565.15. On September 15, 2008, it closed at 1192.7.
Index price information is available on http://finance.yahoo.com.
28
On October 10, 2008, the S&P 500 closed at 899.22. On March 9, 2009, the index closed at 676.53,
down 57 percent from the historic high on October 9, 2007. Index price information is available on
http://finance.yahoo.com.
29
See generally MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: GLOBAL PANIC AND GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS—
HOW WE GOT HERE AND WHAT MUST BE DONE TO FIX IT (FT Press 2009).
19
20
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money markets that fund operating cash flow for many businesses. 30
Investment banks were not immune, and indeed they were especially
vulnerable to a disturbance in the credit market because of their highly
leveraged balance sheets. 31 An inability to fund working capital had the
potential to wreck havoc by impairing the flow of credit even in healthy,
nonfinancial sectors of the economy. 32 According to Ben Bernanke, a
prominent scholar of the Great Depression and current Chairman of the
Federal Reserve, “the financial shocks that hit the global economy in
September and October were the worst since the 1930s, and they helped
push the global economy into the deepest recession since World War II.” 33
This crisis prompted the federal government to take unprecedented
intervention in the market.
On October 3, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 into law.34 This centerpiece
legislation of the financial crisis authorized the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (“TARP”), a $700 billion fund available to the U.S. Treasury
Department (“the Treasury”) to buy troubled assets from financial
institutions. 35 Shortly thereafter, the Treasury used TARP to inject $125
billion in capital in the form of preferred shares and warrants into nine
leading financial institutions, including the Bank and Merrill.36 With respect
Conrad de Aenlle, It Couldn‟t Get Worse, But It Did, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008 at BU19 (noting that
credit markets were seizing up and investors were withdrawing money from the commercial paper
market). See also Carter Dougherty & Katrin Bennhold, Credit Squeeze Takes Hold in Europe, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
11,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/business/worldbusiness/11crunch.html.
31
Rhee, supra note 11.
32
Id.
33
Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress Before the H. Comm. Financial Servs., 111th
Congr. (July 21, 2009) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors for the Fed.
Reserve System) [hereinafter “Bernanke Testimony of July 21, 2009”]. Bernanke was a professor of
economics at Princeton University before his appointment as chairman of the Federal Reserve. He
testified that without the massive government intervention the economy would probably have collapsed.
He provided this chilling assessment:
30

I think you would‟ve had a very good chance of a collapse of the credit system. Even what
we did see, with perhaps the failure of Lehman was for example, commercial paper rates shot
up and availability declined. Many other markets were severely disrupted, including
corporate bond markets. So even with the rescue and even with the stabilization that we
achieved in October, there was a severe increase in stress in the financial markets. My belief
is that if we had not had the money to address the global banking crisis in October we might
very well have had a collapse of the global banking system that would‟ve created a huge
problem in financial markets, and in the broad economy that might‟ve lasted many years.
Id.
34
12 U.S.C. §§ 5201 et seq. (2008).
35
Id. § 5225.
36
On October 28, 2008, these capital injections were made: Bank of America ($15 billion), Bank of
New York Mellon ($3 billion), Citigroup ($25 billion), Goldman Sachs ($10 billion), JPMorgan Chase
($25 billion), Morgan Stanley ($10 billion), State Street ($2 billion), Wells Fargo ($25 billion), Merrill
Lynch ($10 billion). Troubled Asset Relief Program Transaction Report (Nov. 17, 2008), available at
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to the Bank, the federal government purchased 600,000 shares of nonvoting
preferred stock and warrants to purchase over 73 million shares of common
stock.37 However, the government did not acquire substantial voting control
over the Bank.38
On November 3, 2008, the Bank issued the merger proxy with
information dated as of October 30.39 The proxy identified as a risk factor
the possibility that changing market conditions may ultimately affect the
deal economics. 40 Among other things, it warned that changes in the
operations and prospects, general market and economic conditions “may
significantly alter the value of Bank of America or Merrill Lynch or the
prices of shares of Bank of America common stock or Merrill Lynch
common stock by the time the merger is completed.”41
On November 5, 2008, Merrill reported in its third quarter 10-Q an
$8.25 billion pretax loss from continuing operations.42 The 10-Q disclosed
difficult market conditions that could adversely affect financial results.43 A
day later, the Bank also issued its 10-Q, which provided similar warnings,
including “Merrill Lynch‟s ability to mitigate its risk by selling or hedging
its exposures is also limited by the market environment, and its future
results may continue to be materially impacted by the valuation
adjustments applied to these positions.”44 These disclosures simply stated
the obvious. The common experience of all investors in the equity markets,
including shareholders of both Merrill and the Bank, would have suggested
that the financial markets were highly volatile.

http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/reportsanddocs.html. Preferred stock is equity capital that has
priority over common stock, and is usually characterized by a priority on dividends and assets upon
liquidation relative to common stock. BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 1553 (9th ed. 2009). Warrants are
stock options issued by the company. Id. at 1555.
37
Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Item 1.01 & A-7 (Oct. 31, 2008).
38
The 73 million shares would constitute a small percentage of shares. See Bank of Am. Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (over 5 billion shares of common stock issued and outstanding as of December
31, 2008).
39
MERGER PROXY, supra note 15.
40
Id. at 23-26.
41
Id. at 24.
42
Merrill Lynch & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4 (Nov. 5, 2008).
43
Merrill cautioned that “[t]he challenging conditions that existed in the global financial markets during
the first half of the year continued during the third quarter of 2008”; that this “adverse market
environment [had] intensified towards the end of the quarter, particularly in September, and was
characterized by increased illiquidity in the credit markets, wider credit spreads . . . and concerns about
corporate earnings and the solvency of many financial institutions”; that “[t]urbulent market conditions
in the short and medium-term will continue to have an adverse impact on our core businesses”; and that
“our businesses must contend with extreme volatility and continued deleveraging in the market.” Id. at
82-83.
44
Bank of America Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 175-77 (Nov. 6, 2008). The 10-Q also
disclosed: that “difficult market conditions have adversely affected our industry”; that there has been
“significant write-downs of asset values by financial institutions”; and that “lack of confidence in the
financial markets has adversely affected our business, financial condition and results of operations.” Id.
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In late November 2008, the Federal Reserve approved the merger
under the Bank Holding Act,45 and on December 5, the shareholders of the
Bank and Merrill voted in favor of the deal.46 Thereafter, in early December
while the acquisition was still pending, Lewis learned that Merrill was
accruing enormous losses from its investments in toxic assets. 47 On
December 14, he advised the board of this development.48 This unexpected
news gave the Bank serious pause about closing the acquisition. Lewis
considered exercising the merger agreement‟s material adverse change
clause (“MAC”), which if legally exercised would have allowed the
company to terminate the deal based on a material change in events after
the signing of the merger agreement but before closing.49
On December 17, Lewis told Henry Paulson, then Treasury
Secretary, and Bernanke that the Bank was considering invoking the
MAC. 50 Lewis told them that the estimated losses at Merrill were $12
billion for the fourth quarter of 2008, a staggering $3 billion increase from
previous estimate of just six days before. 51 These losses were stunning.52
Paulson and Bernanke strongly advised Lewis against terminating the
Merrill deal because they believed that this would lead to adverse
consequences, including the insolvency of Merrill, litigation against the
Bank, and the injection of more systemic risk and uncertainty into the
capital market.53 The Federal Reserve believed that if the deal fell through,
Merrill could not have survived as an independent firm and would have
collapsed like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.54 It feared that Merrill‟s

45

Bank Of America And Merrill Lynch: How Did A Private Deal Turn Into A Federal Bailout? Part II,
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Congr. (June 25, 2009) (statement of
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors for the Fed. Reserve System).
46
Id.
47
In re Executive Compensation Investigation: Bank of America-Merrill Lynch Before the Attorney
General of the State of New York 11-12 (Feb. 26, 2009) (examination of Kenneth Lee Lewis, Chief
Executive Officer, Bank of America) (identifying the period as December 5 through 14), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit%20A%20to%204.23.09%20letter.pdf
[hereinafter “Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General”].
48
Id. at 13.
49
Id. at 37.
50
Bernanke was appointed to a four-year term as the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve on February 1, 2006. Paulson was the Treasury Secretary from July 2006 to January 2009 under
the Bush Administration. Before this, he was the CEO of Goldman Sachs.
51
Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 40.
52
In an e-mail, Paulson described the losses as “breath-taking.” Michael R. Crittenden, Fed Emails Bash
BofA Chief in Tussle over Merrill Deal, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at A1. Another internal e-mail from
a senior vice president at the Federal Reserve reads, “Merrill is really scary and ugly.” Paul Tharp,
Lewis Ticks „Em Off: Jittery BofA Head Keeps Silence Before Congress, N.Y. POST, June 12, 2009, at
31.
53
See infra Part I.B. (discussing the roles of both Paulson and Bernanke).
54
Merrill‟s deterioration was significant, and “all but ensure[d] that the firm could not survive as a
stand-alone entity without raising substantial new capital (and/or government support) that is unlikely to
be available given the uncertainty about its prospects,” Phil Mattingly, Did Bank of America Get Stong-
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collapse would have continued a domino effect to other systemicallyimportant financial institutions.55
On December 21, Lewis talked to Paulson again about exercising
the MAC. During this crucial conversation, Paulson threatened to fire the
Bank‟s board and management if the company sought to terminate or
renegotiate the merger. 56 Such termination or renegotiation of the deal
would have jeopardized the merger or delayed its closing. 57 Lewis took this
message back to the board.58
On December 22, the board met to discuss whether it was still in
favor of proceeding with the Merrill acquisition.59 The board minutes show
that Lewis in his CEO capacity reported to the board these key points of the
call with Paulson:
(i) first and foremost, the Treasury and Fed are unified in their view that the failure
of the Corporation to complete the acquisition of Merrill Lynch would result in
systemic risk to the financial services system in America and would have adverse
consequences for the Corporation;
(ii) second, the Treasury and Fed stated strongly that were the Corporation to invoke
the material adverse change (“MAC”) clause in the merger agreement with Merrill
Lynch and fail to close the transaction, the Treasury and Fed would remove the
Board and management of the Corporation;
(iii) third, the Treasury and Fed have confirmed that they will provide assistance to
the Corporation to restore capital and to protect the Corporation against adverse
impact of certain Merrill Lynch assets; and
(iv) fourth, the Fed and Treasury stated that the investment and asset protection
promised could not be provided or completed by scheduled closing date of the
merger, January 1, 2009; that the merger should close on schedule, and that the
Corporation can rely on the Fed and Treasury to complete and deliver the promised
support by January 20, 2009, the date scheduled for the release of earnings by the
Corporation.60

At the board meeting, Lewis communicated the management‟s
recommendation not to invoke the MAC.61 This recommendation was based
on, among other things, “instruction from the Fed and Treasury not to
exercise the MAC” and the government‟s verbal assurance of financial
assistance through TARP to support the Bank and provide some downside
Armed
in
Merrill
Deal?,
C.Q.
TODAY ,
June
10,
2009,
available
at
http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000003140207.
55
Id.
56
Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 52.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 53.
60
Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America Corporation, at 2 (Dec. 22,
2008) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Board Minutes of Dec. 22, 2008”], available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit%20B%20to%204.23.09%20letter.pdf.
61
Id. at 2-3.
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protection against declining asset values. 62 One board member, called to
testify before Congress, recalled the following from the board meeting:
[Lewis] expressed the fact that the government thought it would be a major mistake
for us to walk away. They thought it would be very dangerous systemically and very
dangerous and not positive at all for the Bank of America. . . . He expressed the
sentiment and there was another session later in the month, that the government
would provide financing. There was nothing in writing, but it was from very senior
officials of the government that one would believe would follow through. The details
were not reviewed with the board. . . . The issue was relatively clear to me. In a
perfect world, it would have been better to walk away.63

With respect to the board‟s inability or disinclination to “walk away” from
Merrill, this board member “express[ed] remorse for all shareholders” who
took the financial loss.64
Based on the considerations presented to the board, it decided not
to invoke the MAC, renegotiate the merger price with Merrill, or inform
shareholders of Merrill‟s losses ahead of planned disclosure.65 The minutes
purport to document the basis for this decision:
Discussion ensued, with the Board clarifying that [it] was not persuaded or
influenced by the statement by the federal regulators that the Board and management
would be removed by the federal regulators if the Corporation were to exercise the
MAC clause and fail to complete the acquisition of Merrill Lynch. The Board
concurred it would reach a decision that it deemed in the best interest of the
Corporation and its shareholders without regard to this representation by the federal
regulators.66

While self-consciously professing its independence, the board made a
considered decision (the deliberate decision not to invoke a MAC), and
thereby decided to close the Merrill merger as planned.67
On January 1, 2009, ten days after the Bank‟s board meeting, the
acquisition of Merrill closed.68 Other than the original merger proxy, there
62

Id.
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did A Private Deal Turn Into A Federal Bailout? Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 16-17 (Nov. 17, 2009) (statements of
Brian Moynihan, President of Consumer and Small Business Banking, Bank of Am., Charles Gifford,
Member, Bank of Am. Bd. of Dirs., Thomas May, Member, Bank of Am. Bd. of Dirs., and Timothy
Mayopolous, Former General Counsel, Bank of Am.) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Gifford et al.
Testimony”]
64
Id. at 15. This testimony sought to explain an email in which the board member wrote, “Unfortunately,
it‟s [sic] also screw[s] the shareholders.” Id. While the language in this private email is crude, it
provides an unvarnished assessment of the effect on shareholders.
65
Board Minutes of Dec. 22, 2008, supra note 60, at 2-3. The minutes provide: “Mr. Lewis stated the
purpose of the special meeting is to insure that the Board is in accord with management‟s
recommendation to complete the acquisition of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. („Merrill Lynch‟), as
scheduled on January 1, 2009, pursuant to the [merger agreement] . . . after due consideration of the
undertakings and admonishments of the federal regulators.” Id. at 1.
66
Id. at 3.
67
Id.
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was no supplemental disclosure to shareholders on Merrill‟s deteriorating
financial condition before closing.69
On January 16, the Bank disclosed that losses from Merrill were
over $15 billion for the fourth quarter ended December 31, 2008.70 This was
over $3 billion more than the $12 billion estimate Lewis had learned in
mid-December, but the information had not been disclosed to
shareholders.71 The Bank also disclosed that it would receive an additional
$20 billion in TARP funds (an investment of preferred stock with an 8
percent dividend), and would receive insurance protection from market
exposure of $118 billion in assets, primarily exposure from Merrill‟s
portfolio.72
B.

Reflections of the Principal Actors

Like the fire sale of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, the acquisition of Merrill was a key event in the history of Wall
Street and the financial crisis. 73 This deal also became controversial. 74
Without the involvement of Paulson and Bernanke, there was a possibility
that the Bank would have invoked the MAC and thereby compromised or
complicated the deal. Controversy surrounding the government‟s role in the
merger ensued when Lewis was called to testify before the New York
Attorney General‟s office.75
Lewis testified that the federal government played a coercive role
in the merger. 76 The government disapproved of terminating the deal or
68

Press Release, Bank of Am. Corp., Bank of America Completes Merrill Lynch Purchase (Jan. 1, 2009).
Based on the stock price, the deal closed at a value of $29.1 billion. Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q), at 9 (May 7, 2009).
69
See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
70
Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Jan. 16, 2009).
71
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
72
Bank of Am. Corp, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Jan. 16, 2009).
73
The demise of these three firms marks the end of Wall Street‟s era of independent investment banks.
During the 1990s, leading up to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, independent investment banks had
been acquired by large commercial banks. See generally ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM,
JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW (2007) (discussing the business of
investment banking and historical industry trends). Each of these firms was acquired by a commercial
bank: Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase, investment banking assets of Lehman Brothers by Barclays,
and Merrill Lynch by Bank of America. Today, only Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley remain
independent, pure investment banks even though they converted to bank holding companies in 2008.
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1-2 (Nov. 28, 2008); Morgan Stanley &
Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Nov. 30, 2008).
74
Louise Story & Jo Becker, Bank Chief Tells of U.S. Pressure to Buy Merrill Lynch, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 2009, at B1; Zachary Kouwe, Paulson Expected to Face Hard Questioning on Merrill Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2009, at B3; Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke Defends His Role in Merrill Sale, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2009, at B1.
75
The attorney general‟s office was investigating agreements on executive bonuses associated with the
merger. See infra note 110.
76
See Lewis Testimony before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 52).
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delaying the closing to renegotiate price.77 Paulson threatened that if the
Bank backed out of the deal with Merrill the government “could” or
“would” fire the management and board. 78 Lewis believed that the
government had the power to carry out its threat.79 Upon being threatened,
he suggested that the Bank and government “deescalate this for a while.”80
Absent the federal government‟s threat, Lewis wanted to invoke the MAC,
but felt he had no choice in the matter.81 He thought that “it was in the best
interest to go forward as had been instructed” because “if [the government]
had felt that strongly, then that should be a strong consideration for us to
take into account.” 82 As far as shareholders, their interest could not be
isolated from systemic risk considerations; the best interests of the country
and shareholders were intertwined. 83 While going forward with the deal
meant a short-term loss for shareholders, Merrill still filled strategic
necessities and over the long term would still benefit shareholders.84
After this testimony, the New York Attorney General‟s office
wrote to Congress and informed it of questions “about the transparency of
the TARP program, as well as about corporate governance and disclosure
practices at Bank of America.” 85 This prompted the congressional
testimonies of Lewis, Bernanke, and Paulson. 86 While their testimonies
differ in shades, they largely support Lewis‟s account of events.
Lewis reaffirmed his prior testimony that Paulson‟s threat did not
impress him so much as the seriousness of a situation that could have led
the government to threaten a company and CEO in good standing. 87 The
exercise of the MAC would have posed risks, including litigation risk and
the risk of losing government support during a financial crisis.88 According
77

Bank of Am., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 90-91 (Jan. 16, 2009).
Id. at 52.
79
Id. at 54.
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Id. at 52.
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Id. at 58, 96.
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Id. at 97, 151.
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Bank of Am., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 82-83 (Jan. 16, 2009).
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Id. at 86.
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Letter from Andrew Cuomo, Att‟y Gen., State of N.Y., to Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Sen.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs; Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, H. Fin. Servs. Comm.;
Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, Sec. Exch. Comm‟n; and Elizabeth Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight Panel
(Apr. 23, 2009).
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Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did A Private Deal Turn Into A Federal Bailout? Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (June 11, 2009) (testimony of
Kenneth Lee Lewis, Chief Executive Officer, Bank of America), (Morning Session, June 11, 2009)
[hereinafter “Lewis Testimony Part I”]; (testimony of Lewis) (Afternoon Session, June 11, 2009), at 2
[“Lewis Testimony Part II”]; (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Board) (June 25,
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88
Id. at 30.
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to Lewis, closing the deal was the better option.89 He added that the “target
was to [complete the merger] so that we didn‟t damage the economy
anymore.” 90 The Merrill acquisition was “in the best interests of the
financial system, the economy and the country” because the collapse of
Merrill, “on the heels of Lehman‟s failure, could have caused systemic
havoc or necessitated an AIG-style government bailout.” 91 Shareholder
interest was inextricably intertwined with the financial system; harm to the
financial system would have inflicted harm to the company as well. 92
Furthermore, the acquisition had strategic value and promised long-term
reward.93 Merrill‟s losses would push the profitability of the deal toward a
longer time horizon and affected short-term shareholder value. 94 As for
disclosure, the government did not ask the board to withhold any disclosure
to shareholders.95 Merrill‟s losses were not disclosed before the deal closed
because there was no agreement on its timing.96
For his part, Paulson confirmed that he threatened to fire the board
and management.97 He testified that the exercise of the MAC would have
demonstrated “a colossal lack of judgment and would jeopardize Bank of
America, Merrill Lynch, and the financial system.” 98 He and Bernanke
believed that invoking a MAC would have been detrimental to both the
Bank and the financial system.99 Lawyers at the Federal Reserve believed
that the Bank did not have sound legal basis to exercise the MAC.100 The
market would have viewed the legal merit of invoking the MAC as “quite
low” and both Merrill and the Bank would have been adversely affected by
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Id. at 7, 9.
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the possibility of detrimental litigation.101 In justifying his threat, Paulson
added that “it‟s a pretty logical conclusion that maybe even the regulator
would be irresponsible . . . if they didn‟t hold [the Bank and Merrill]
accountable.”102 This statement implies that the board and management of
the Bank would have been replaced if they had proceeded with an illadvised legal stratagem to abort the merger.
Bernanke and Paulson distinguished their obligations as regulators
from the board‟s duty to shareholders. They testified that SEC disclosure
obligations were the company‟s responsibility. 103 The government‟s
disclosure obligation is to the public, set forth in TARP, which the
government satisfied. 104 Bank supervisory practice did not permit a
regulator to impose an obligation on a financial institution to financially
injure itself for the public interest.105 Conversely, regulators did not have a
duty to protect the pecuniary interest of shareholders or bondholders vis-àvis the soundness of the financial institution and the markets or more
broadly the public welfare. In administering TARP, the Treasury Secretary
must take into consideration various factors including the protection of
taxpayers, stability of the financial markets, long-term viability of financial
institutions, and efficient use of funds.106
Bernanke and Paulson echoed Lewis‟s assessment of the public
role the Bank served in stabilizing the financial market: Merrill would have
collapsed without a takeover; a renegotiation of the purchase price would
have created uncertainty in the market; the failure of Merrill, which was
bigger than Lehman Brothers, would have destabilized the financial market
even further.107
On the issue of whether the Bank‟s shareholders were forced “to
take a bullet,” Paulson testified:
[S]ome have opined that government officials involved in examining the Bank of
America Merrill Lynch merger—myself included—allowed concerns about systemic
risk to our nation‟s financial system to outweigh concerns about potential harm to
Bank of America and its shareholders. That simply did not happen. In my view, and
the view of the numerous government officials working on the matter, the interests
of the nation and Bank of America were aligned with respect to the closing of the
Merrill Lynch transaction. An attempt by Bank of America to break its contract to
acquire Merrill Lynch would have threatened the stability of our entire financial
system and the viability of both Bank of America and Merrill Lynch.108
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Bernanke added: “I think it was a very successful transaction. It helped
stabilize the financial markets. It put two companies back on a healthy path.
It protected our economy. And it was a good deal for taxpayers. . . . And it
achieved public objectives that were very important.”109 Thus, both Paulson
and Bernanke forcefully defended their conduct and argued that
government action produced positive effects on the two companies and the
financial markets.
C.

Merger Execution and Fiduciary Duty

As a preliminary manner, the Bank poorly executed the Merrill
acquisition. The disclosure and procedural issues stand out: were the board
and the shareholders properly informed by the management, advisers, and
the merger proxy, respectively, when each approved the acquisition? Only
findings of facts or admissions on the extent of knowable information and
the scienter at the time can resolve these issues. I comment no further on
the disclosure and federal securities issues. 110 I assume that, as Lewis‟s
testimony suggests, the Bank learned of the accelerating pace of Merrill
losses after the shareholder vote on December 5, 2008, and that disclosure
of material facts up to this point, including the merger proxy, containing
financial information dated October 30, was proper and thus the
shareholder vote was not tainted by faulty disclosure. Trial on these issues
may later prove these assumptions wrong, but the disclosure issue is
tangential to the thesis of this Article, which advances a theory of fiduciary
exemption and a broader comment on shareholder primacy.
The duty of care with respect to the merger execution on
September 13-15 is also tangential. This issue is relevant here only insofar
109

Bernanke Testimony, supra note 86, at 21.
As of the writing of this Article, issues pertaining to the disclosure issue are rapidly developing. On
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as the quality of the due diligence may explain in part the board‟s later
consideration to terminate the deal, the event leading to the government‟s
involvement in the Bank‟s corporate governance. To develop this thought, I
assess the duty of care issue.
A board‟s decision must be informed and made in good faith. This
requirement calls into question the board‟s initial approval of the merger.
The Delaware standard for the duty of care is gross negligence.111 With an
informed decision based on proper due diligence, the business judgment
rule would protect the board‟s decision to approve the merger. 112 The
decision of the Bank‟s board constituted a high-risk strategic decision, and
Delaware courts would not engage in ex post analysis of an informed, good
faith judgment made under uncertainty even if the merger was poorly
executed or the outcome was poor.113
However, the board‟s decision was not an informed one because
the procedure used to approve the Merrill acquisition was highly flawed.
The facts in the seminal decision, Smith v. Van Gorkom,114 are informative.
There, the target company was undergoing a sale process.115 The board was
found to have violated the duty of care based on several factors: a failure to
adequately inform itself of vital aspects of the deal, including the intrinsic
value of the company; approving the sale after only two hours of
consideration; and failure to read the deal documents because they were
unavailable at the board meeting.116 The Delaware Supreme Court held that
these facts were sufficient to prove the board‟s gross negligence.117
The publicly available facts suggest that the Bank‟s board was
grossly negligent in the process used to approve the Merrill acquisition.
Indeed, the board‟s negligence is qualitatively worse than the simple
negligence in Van Gorkom.118 The obvious problem is the quality of the due
diligence. The merger agreement states that due diligence on the deal was
111
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conducted over a period of a day and a half (Saturday afternoon to Sunday
evening), about thirty hours. 119 Such a short time period could not have
been sufficient to conduct adequate due diligence on a business as big and
complex as Merrill Lynch in normal times, let alone in a time of extreme
market volatility and crisis. Is it plausible that the Bank adequately
reviewed within a matter of a few hours asset quality, liabilities, trading
positions, risk management structures, values at risk, along with many other
facets of the business? The answer is certainly not. The two companies
probably engaged armies of internal and external lawyers, accountants, and
bankers, and there was probably frantic activity during the weekend,
creating an illusion of due diligence. But raw manpower can only do so
much in a short time period; reasonable due diligence entails contemplation
and assimilation of information learned.120
The choice of financial advisers, no small decision, is also
informative. Merrill used its own investment bankers who delivered the
fairness opinion.121 The Bank hired two financial advisers who delivered
fairness opinions: J.C. Flowers & Co., a private equity firm, and Fox-Pitt
Kelton Cochran Caronia Waller (“FPK”), a boutique investment bank
specializing in financial institutions.122 A deal like the merger of the Bank
and Merrill would be a landmark transaction on Wall Street with huge
investment banking fees (J.C. Flowers and FPK received a total of $20
million in fees).123 The advisory work on these kinds of deals are usually
handled by top-tier investment banking firms, such as Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, UBS Warburg, Credit Suisse First Boston, JPMorgan
Chase, or other comparable firms. Why use one‟s own investment bankers
as Merrill did, and a private equity firm and a boutique investment bank as
the Bank did for such a large complex deal?
One can speculate on several plausible explanations. J.C. Flowers
had experience in restructuring of financial institutions. It was involved in
attempting to rescue Bear Stearns only a few months before.124 Because it is
119
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a private equity firm, it did not compete with Merrill or the Bank on capital
markets and trading activities. 125 Both firms may have been concerned
about competitors gaining intelligence on their assets and liabilities and
trading book, which may have had enormous informational value during
unprecedented market turmoil. This is not to impugn the honesty or
professionalism of investment bankers, but only to suggest that the risk of
harmful leaks, rumors, and misinformation may have been substantial and
potentially fatal in volatile markets. Even so, the companies could have
used other investment bankers who were not competitors in capital market
activities, such as Lazard, a premier boutique mergers and acquisition
advisor with deep expertise in financial institutions. 126 Another plausible
explanation for why the boards of the Bank and Merrill used these advisers
is that perhaps the major investment banks did not want to run the risk of
advising on this deal under these situational constraints. There may have
been substantial liability as well as reputational risks associated with the
merger. At the time, most large investment and money center banks were
embroiled in their own fights for survival.127 The prestige and the fees may
not have been worth exposing themselves to the legal risks of issuing a
fairness opinion under these constraints, necessitating the appointment of
other financial advisers who were more willing to undertake the risks for
the fees and the opportunity to work on a landmark deal.
Another point about due diligence is worth mentioning. It is
standard protocol that when rendering fairness opinions for a deal,
investment bankers do not independently assess the company‟s assets and
liabilities.128 Both the FPK and J.C. Flowers fairness opinion letters have
such a disclaimer. 129 The specific disclaimer of non-verification of the
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company‟s assets and liabilities is a standard term in fairness opinions.130 If
the financial advisers were not analyzing the quality of the assets and
liabilities, who were? While the fairness opinions spoke to the value of the
firm based on market metrics, including transaction and comparable
companies multiples and discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis, 131 such
top-down valuational analyses are largely worthless under the extenuating
circumstances. The value drivers of the Bank-Merrill merger were not
market metrics or theoretical outputs from a DCF model. They were instead
the fair values of assets and liabilities, which could only have been
determined by a bottom-up, independent assessment of the firm‟s internal
books. The crisis posed unique valuational issues. For instance, in a failing
market system the “fair value” may not necessarily have been the “fair
market value” per mark-to-market pricing. 132 There could have been a
significant divergence between the “hold” and the “sale” values of exotic
and illiquid security with enormous uncertainty as to the former, thus
discounting the latter value. Valuation would have required a bottom-up
cash flow analysis of the individual assets and liabilities, and calculations
of both the “hold” and the “sale” values. When markets are highly unstable
or severely malfunctioning, the indices of price reflected in standard market
and theoretical valuation techniques cannot possibly form the basis for a
fairness opinion, and at least the use of the typical fairness opinion should
not provide legal cover for a lack of common sense.133
Only a deal team with proper skills and sufficient time could have
performed a bottom-up analysis of the internal books, which is the only
way reasonable due diligence could have been done when there is a
and other publicly available information with respect to Merrill Lynch‟s financial condition,
results of operations and prospects.
MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, at Appendices D, D-1. Clearly, other aspects of this fairness opinion
letter are custom tailored to the unique situation of this merger: for example, the specific reference to
“contingent, derivative, off-balance sheet or otherwise.” Id. J.C. Flowers fairness opinion also provides:
“We have assumed and relied upon the accuracy and completeness of the information . . . provided by
each of the Company and the Acquiror. We did not independently verify the accuracy or completeness
of any such information, nor will we do so in the future, and we did not and do not assume any
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significant possibility that the target is a distressed financial institution. A
few months before, JPMorgan Chase found itself in a similar situation with
the rushed, crisis-precipitated acquisition of Bear Stearns. During due
diligence occurring over a single weekend, resembling the circumstance of
the Merrill acquisition, it appeared that JPMorgan Chase would not proceed
with the deal.134 A Bear Stearns board member commented on this apparent
development: “If I were Jamie Dimon [JPMorgan Chase‟s CEO], I would
have had some concerns myself because you never do a deal as big as that
on one day‟s due diligence. What‟s the upside versus the downside?” 135
Notably, JPMorgan Chase continued with the Bear Stearns acquisition only
with government financial support and risk sharing arrangements. To
suggest that the Bank fully assessed Merrill within a matter of a few hours
during extraordinary circumstances is a bridge too far. 136 The deviation
from what is reasonable under the circumstances here is so great that
executing the merger agreement while essentially blind to the underlying
values of the assets and liabilities of a business as complex as Merrill meets
the demanding standard of gross negligence and perhaps even reckless
dereliction of duty. 137 This is a far greater transgression than Jason Van
Gorkom‟s execution of the merger agreement at the Chicago Lyric Opera,
which was largely a problem of optics.138
Although the Bank‟s board was grossly negligent in executing the
acquisition, it would not be liable in fact. The decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom resulted in the enactment of DGCL section 102(b)(7). 139 This
statute allows for a provision in the certificate of incorporation eliminating
or limiting the personal liability of a director for monetary damages for
134

Id. at 95.
Id. (quoting Fred Salerno). JPMorgan Chase was able to proceed with the deal despite the problem of
proper due diligence only because it received unprecedented financial assistance from the government,
including among other things a $30 billion secured loan. Id. at 101.
136
Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke Defends Role on Merrill, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at B1 (quoting
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breach of the duty of care.140 The Bank, a Delaware corporation, has such
an exculpatory provision.141
With the deal execution in context, we can synthesize the operative
facts concerning the Bank board‟s actions in mid-December 2008—after,
as this Article assumes, the board, the Federal Reserve, and shareholders
approved the deal.
The Merrill acquisition had a profound link to the financial markets.
The government coerced the Bank‟s board and management to close the
merger. This threat was credible because federal banking agencies have the
power to remove a corporation‟s board and management upon a showing
that they engaged in unsafe or unsound practice resulting in financial loss
or probable loss. 142 The government was motivated by the need to stem
further harm to the financial market, the most immediate problem being a
collapse of Merrill on the heels of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
Lewis‟s and the board‟s motivations are more ambiguous. Viewed
narrowly in terms of deal economics, closing the acquisition was
financially bad for shareholders since the company assumed far greater,
multi-billion dollar losses than it had expected. 143 Like many classic
corporate law cases, the motivations of the board and Lewis, acting in his
capacity both as CEO and chairman of the board, do not sort into tidy
categories or neat characterizations. The episode is colored in shades of
gray, and one must engage in some degree of plausible speculation.
The board minutes plainly state that the government‟s threat did not
influence the board members,144 though such self-serving notice, by itself,
cannot be taken seriously. The cynic is sometimes wise. The board was
140
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aware of the potential for shareholder derivative or federal securities
litigation. The board minutes state that Lewis recommended not invoking a
MAC because the government told him not to do so, and he changed his
mind only in response to Paulson‟s threat.145 Internal e-mails at the Federal
Reserve show that Lewis was concerned about lawsuits and sought to use
the government‟s position as a legal defense. Scott Alvarez, the general
counsel of the Federal Reserve, wrote in an e-mail:
[Lewis] said he now fears lawsuits from shareholders for NOT invoking the MAC,
given the deterioration at [Merrill]. I don‟t think that‟s very likely and said so.
However, he still asked whether he could use as a defense that the govt ordered him
to proceed for systemic reasons. I said no. It is true, however, that we have done
analyses that indicate that not going through with the merger would pose important
risks at [the Bank] itself. So here‟s my question: Can the supervisors formally advise
him that a MAC is not in the best interest of his company? If we did, could he cite
that in defense if he did get sued for not pursuing a MAC?146

In a subsequent e-mail, Alvarez wrote to Bernanke:
All that said, I don‟t think it‟s necessary or appropriate for us to give Lewis a letter
along the lines he asked. First, we didn‟t order him to go forward—we simply
explained our views on what the market reaction would be and left the decision to
him. Second, making hard decisions is what he gets paid for and only he has the full
information needed to make the decision—so we shouldn‟t take him off the hook by
appearing to take the decision out of his hands.147

These e-mails show that the consideration of legal risk was a significant
factor in explaining the behavior of Lewis and the board. They also raise
the possibility that the purported purpose of providing government aid can
possibly be used as a defense to a charge of breach of fiduciary duty.
In light of Lewis‟s concern about litigation, it is possible that he
considered terminating the deal, whether contractually sound or not,
because Merrill‟s losses were exposing the failure of due diligence. This
bad outcome called into serious question the competence of the
management and the board. 148 Recall that the Bank had the superior
bargaining leverage on September 13 when Lewis and Thain negotiated the
deal, but nevertheless paid a 70 percent premium for Merrill, which would
then go on to lose over $15 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008.
A flawed due diligence also may be the basis for another
explanation. Faced with a badly executed and overpriced deal of his own
fault, Lewis may have shrewdly tried to salvage a bad situation by
145
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threatening to invoke a MAC, legal basis notwithstanding. He coerced a
frightened government to make financial commitments, which the Bank in
fact got as a part of closing the Merrill deal.149 In the end, the government
also made sure that Lewis and the board paid a personal price for this
deception. 150 This explanation suggests that invoking a MAC was not a
serious possibility after all, but merely a stalking horse. There are no heroes
in this tale, only people making imperfect decisions and exercising bad
judgment in extraordinary times and market conditions.
The theory of covering up a badly executed deal finds additional
support in internal machinations involving the Bank‟s senior managers.
Timothy Mayopoulos, the Bank‟s former general counsel, testified to the
events leading to his termination.151 The timeline is telling. On November
12, 2008, he was given a written projection showing that Merrill would lose
approximately $5 billion in the fourth quarter. 152 On November 20, the
senior management, including Mayopoulos, concluded that the $5 billion
projected loss need not be disclosed to shareholders. 153 On December 1,
senior executives, including the chief financial officer (“CFO”), asked him
to review the MAC clause in the merger agreement, and he advised that
149
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there was no MAC because, among other reasons, Merrill‟s performance
was not disproportionately worse than other firms, including the Bank‟s.154
On December 3, Mayopoulos learned that Merrill‟s losses were estimated
to be $7 billion.155 On December 9, he attended a board meeting and there
learned that this estimate had increased to $9 billion.156 On December 10,
he was fired per Lewis‟s order.157 Subsequently, Brian Moynihan assumed
the role of general counsel, and he opined that the Bank has a valid case to
invoke a MAC.158 Presumably, with this new advice, Lewis was able to
represent to Paulson during their December 17 conversation that he was
considering invoking a MAC, whereas he could not credibly do so if his
general counsel had advised him there was no MAC.159
Lewis‟s use of the MAC as leverage to coerce financial aid is the
dark view of the board‟s motive. However, Lewis is only one board
member, albeit the most important, and there are a number of other
plausible explanations for the board‟s decision to close the deal. The board
could have been intimidated and unduly influenced by the government. It
could have decided to go through with the deal, as the minutes suggest,
based on the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders. It could
have exercised independent judgment and reasonably deferred to the expert
advice of regulators based on broader considerations of systemic risk and
public welfare, which were intimately related to the best interest of the
company in the longterm though current shareholders suffered in the short
term. Lastly, in a complex situation and under stress, perhaps the most
likely explanation is that the board acted with mixed motive, taking all of
these factors into consideration with each board member assigning different
weights to them to come to a collective decision: their entrenchment
interest, their desire to remedy a poorly executed deal, the pecuniary
interest of shareholders, the long-term interest of the corporation, the
financial markets, systemic risk, good faith belief in the expertise of
regulators, and the public welfare.160
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D.

Merger Closing and Fiduciary Duty

If the merger execution was flawed, was the decision to close a
flawed merger also problematic? In the December 22 board meeting, the
Bank‟s board made three important decisions: (1) not to exercise the MAC;
(2) not to renegotiate the purchase price; and (3) not to inform shareholders
of accelerating losses at Merrill before closing of the deal. 161 Upon an
informed decision, the board would be entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule absent disloyalty or bad faith.162 There would be a
loyalty problem if, for example, the board decided not to renegotiate or
terminate the deal based on a conflict of interest, such as the desire to avoid
scrutiny of its initial flawed decision to approve the merger, or to entrench
its interest by acquiescing to the government‟s demand to close the deal in
response to a threat of removal. Let us proceed on the factual assumption
that the board‟s decision was informed, but that the board was conflicted or
not independent. The loyalty issue would still have a serious causation
problem: that is, whether the board even had the legal option to invoke a
MAC at this time.
Found in most merger agreements, a MAC allocates the risk of an
adverse event between signing and closing, and is one of the most
important clauses in a merger agreement. 163 The provision in the BankMerrill merger agreement defines a “material adverse effect” as “a material
adverse effect on (i) the financial condition, results of operations or
business of such party and its Subsidiaries taken as a whole . . . or (ii) the
ability of such party to timely consummate the transactions contemplated
by this Agreement.”164 This definition has a significant carve-out:
The uncertainty of whether we‟d win was a lose-lose for the Bank of America shareholders.” Gifford et
al. Testimony, supra note 63, at 24.
161
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“Material Adverse Effect” shall not be deemed to include effects to the extent
resulting from . . . changes in . . . general business, economic or market conditions,
including changes generally in prevailing interest rates, currency exchange rates,
credit markets and price levels or trading volumes in the United States or foreign
securities markets, in each case generally affecting the industries in which such party
or its Subsidiaries operate and including changes to any previously correctly applied
asset marks resulting there from . . . except . . . to the extent that the effects of such
change are disproportionately adverse to the financial condition, results of operations
or business of such party and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, as compared to other
companies in the industry in which such party and its Subsidiaries operate . . . .165

This definition excludes changes in “general business, economic or market
conditions, including changes generally in . . . credit markets and price
levels or trading volumes in . . . securities market[s],”166 but imports back
into the definition of material adverse effect changes that are
“disproportionately adverse . . . as compared to other companies in the
industry.”167
This carve-out most probably would cover the deterioration of asset
quality on Merrill‟s portfolio. It is clear that the worsening condition of the
capital markets directly caused Merrill‟s losses. This situation is
specifically carved-out of the definition of material adverse effect. The
Bank could have argued that Merrill had previously marked its assets
incorrectly. However, this is a matter of past due diligence, and the MAC is
a forward-looking provision addressing a change in condition after the
signing. It would have been difficult to argue that Merrill‟s changes were
disproportionately adverse as compared to other companies. Merrill was
one of only five independent investment banks remaining after the industry
consolidation of the 1990s, the others being Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns. 168 By the time Merrill was
accruing the losses in question, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brother, two true
peers of Merrill, had already succumbed to the crisis, and Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley were struggling to survive. 169 Most other major
financial institutions with investment banking or trading activities, such as
Citigroup, AIG, and UBS, were also highly distressed. 170 Importantly, as
165
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well, the Bank was also distressed, and Merrill‟s situation was arguably no
more adverse than the Bank‟s. 171 By this time as well, the government
forced the leading financial institutions, including Merrill and the Bank, to
accept TARP funding. 172 Extreme distress in financial condition was the
norm in the investment banking and financial institutions sector, which is
not surprising given that their distress triggered the worldwide economic
crisis.173
The MAC was written into the merger agreement on September 1415, 2008, at a time when the financial markets were becoming highly
unstable.174 The merger consideration was a stock exchange, which meant
that the market values of both Merrill and the Bank were subject to
fluctuations in the value of their assets. The parties clearly understood that
market volatility would likely affect the deal price, but each party equally
assumed this risk. Although Merrill suffered heavy losses, they were not a
MAC as defined in the merger agreement.
No Delaware case has upheld the exercise of a MAC, and this is the
result of a deliberate policy choice. 175 A recent Delaware case, Hexion
Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.,176 which involved a material
change experienced during the recent economic crisis, is illustrative. This
case demonstrates the challenge the Bank would have faced in a contract
dispute with Merrill. There, an acquirer was disappointed with the expected
financial performance of the target, which was affected by the economic
crisis of 2008.177 The merger agreement defined a material adverse effect as
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1; Nelson Schwartz & Julia Werdigier, UBS to Write Down Another
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“any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect that is materially
adverse to the financial condition, business, or results of operations,” but
there is no materially adverse event if “any occurrence, condition, change,
event or effect resulting from or relating to changes in general economic or
financial market conditions.”178 After signing the merger agreement in July
2007, the target suffered in the second half of 2007: a 22 percent shortfall
from projections made in June 2007; a 20 percent decline in earnings before
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”) in the first half of
2008 from the previous year‟s results; and as of early August 2008, a
projected 32 percent decrease for the forecast year 2008 from 2007 result.179
These are substantial deterioration of financial performance.
The court of chancery held that no material adverse event
occurred.180 When a target company‟s financials deteriorate, the standard is
“whether there has been an adverse change in the target‟s business that is
consequential to the company‟s long-term earnings power over a
commercially reasonable period, which one would expect to be measured in
years rather than months.” 181 A MAC protects against the occurrence of
unknown events that substantially threaten to produce poor earnings
significantly into the future, and not against “short-term hiccup in
earnings.”182 As the court noted, “If Hexion wanted the short-term forecasts
of Huntsman warranted by Huntsman, it could have negotiated for that. It
could have tried to negotiate a lower base price and something akin to an
earn-out, based not on Huntsman‟s post-closing performance but on its
performance between signing and closing.”183
Another Delaware case, In re IBP, Inc. Shareholder Litigation,184 is
also a helpful reference. There, material adverse effect was defined as:
any event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or facts which has had or
reasonably could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect . . . on the condition
(financial or otherwise), business, assets, liabilities or results of operations of [the target] and
[its] Subsidiaries taken as a whole. 185

The first quarter of the target‟s earnings ran 64 percent behind the
comparable prior year‟s period. 186 Applying New York law, the court of
chancery found the issue “a close one” and concluded that the outcome
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hinged on the burden and standard of proof.187 The court ultimately found
that the target was a consistently profitable company, but profits were
erratic and the company was struggling to implement a strategy to reduce
cyclicality of earnings.188 Although the target may not have performed as
well as the acquirer had hoped, it appeared to be in sound enough shape to
deliver results in line with its recent historical performance.189 According to
the court, the acquirer did not meet the burden of proof and thus did not
have the right to invoke the MAC.190
The Hexion standard under Delaware law is a heavy burden.
Absent a clear contractual intent, Delaware courts would be wary of
recognizing a right to terminate a deal based on a material adverse event
because such a precedent would cause great mischief in mergers and
acquisitions struck during economic downturns and market crises, which
would convert buyer‟s remorse into litigation risk.191 Clearly, both the Bank
and Merrill, sophisticated market participants advised by top law firms,192
had anticipated financial adversity and volatility in the period between the
deal‟s signing and closing. This explains why the MAC carved out an
exception for adverse effects resulting from decline in general economic or
market conditions, and specifically changes in the capital markets. The
magnitude of Merrill‟s loss may have been disappointing to the Bank, and
in this respect, outside of the bounds of hopeful expectation, but the
possibility of large losses were certainly contemplated.
If the Bank was concerned about financial deterioration from
signing to closing, it could have contractually protected itself with tighter
conditions. Attempting to put a collar around the range of loss would have
been extremely difficult to negotiate given the volatility of the market.193
The stock exchange ratio (0.8595 shares of the Bank‟s stock for each share
of Merrill stock) did not contain a collar or a repricing mechanism. There
187
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may be several reasons why a collar or repricing mechanism was not used,
but one explanation is that the parties understood that a highly volatile
market could undermine the deal if it was subject to repricing or was
terminable upon exceeding collar limits. The lack of a collar could have
been a bond to close the deal, that is, a commitment to forego future
options to back out of the deal. Once an exchange ratio is fixed, Merrill‟s
stock price becomes loosely pegged to the Bank‟s. We can infer that
contractual terms typically used to limit the parties‟ risk would have
dramatically increased the likelihood of complication or termination prior
to close, which is something ex ante neither contracting parties would have
wanted. The parties fixed a price upon contract signing, and they took the
price risk with respect to the consideration as they saw it at the time. The
MAC did not allow for a termination of the merger agreement based on
changes in market conditions clearly anticipated by the parties at signing.
Merrill‟s $15 billion loss in the fourth quarter was staggering, but it
may be merely an indication of extreme market volatility during that same
time period. 194 According to an 8-K filing, its losses included: credit
valuation adjustments related to monoline financial guarantor exposures of
$3.22 billion, goodwill impairments of $2.31 billion, and the writedowns
on leveraged loans of $1.92 billion, U.S. Bank Investment Securities
Portfolio of $1.16 billion, and commercial real estate of $1.13 billion. 195
These losses totaled $9.74 billion in valuational adjustments to the assets
on the existing portfolio, but they stem from Merrill‟s existing balance
sheet and do not indicate a material deterioration of Merrill‟s forward
business prospects. In fact, the losses proved to be short-term (as of the
writing of this Article), and Merrill returned to profitability though it has
been erratic. 196 Importantly, temporary shortfalls in expectation do not
constitute material adverse events. Therefore, the Bank did not have sound
basis for invoking the MAC, and the government‟s advice against such a
maneuver was correct.
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Without a material adverse event, the board could not have
terminated the merger, or credibly renegotiated the price. In ordinary times,
perhaps the Bank could have attempted to invoke the MAC to renegotiate
the merger consideration even with a low probability legal hand. 197
Frivolous cases are sometimes settled for positive value, especially when
the holder of the legal right is vulnerable.198 But an attempt to do so in these
circumstances would have injected significant systemic risk into the
financial system as Paulson testified: “[I]t would be unthinkable for Bank
of America to take this destructive action for which there was no reasonable
legal basis and which would show a lack of judgment.”199
Given the absence of a viable legal option, neither the shareholders
nor the board could have taken any action to avoid the losses and thus the
board had no fiduciary duty under state law to disclose the Merrill losses,
however material, outside of whatever SEC obligations there were.200 At the
time, market volatility affected the values of assets and liabilities on a dayto-day, mark-to-market basis.201 The internal estimations of Merrill‟s losses
were changing day-to-day in swings of billions of dollars. 202 These wild
swings in estimates caused the buyer‟s remorse. In this situation, the
efficacy of disclosure wholly breaks down because one day‟s accurate
disclosure could very well have been the next day‟s inaccurate information.
What if the board disclosed a $12 billion estimated loss on a Monday, and
on Friday this estimation increased to $15 billion? The board must have
realized the potentially grave harm the corporation risked sustaining if it
voluntarily disclosed certain financial information about Merrill‟s mounting
losses.203 Voluntary disclosure of bad news in an unstable market may have
resulted in greater harm to both corporations and to a financial market
already in peril. These were unprecedented times in the capital markets.
When Paulson threatened to fire the Bank‟s management and board,
the threat created a potential loyalty problem. It is plausible that the board
did not act independently and its members were conflicted. Under
Delaware law, a director is independent if she decides on the merits of the
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transaction rather than on extraneous considerations. 204 Independence is
inconsistent with dominion or control by an individual or entity interested
in the transactions. 205 A director has a conflict of interest if she will be
materially affected by a board‟s decision, in a manner not shared by the
corporation and the shareholders. 206 Self-interest includes a desire for
entrenchment.207 It is not enough that a contrary decision could result in a
loss of position; other facts indicting a disloyal motive must be shown.208 A
credible, articulated, direct threat of termination would probably suffice to
show a potential loyalty problem.209
The facts established through testimony are: Lewis wanted to
exercise the MAC;210 Paulson threatened that to do so would result in the
termination of the board and management; upon management‟s
recommendation, which was based on “instructions” from the government,
the board did not invoke the MAC. These facts plausibly suggest three
scenarios: (1) Lewis and the board hoodwinked the government with the
threat of invoking a low probability legal strategy with a high probability of
large collateral harm if the threat was carried out in an effort to coax public
financial aid; (2) upon reconsideration after receipt of the government‟s
strongly termed advice, the board was persuaded by the government‟s
rationale and they exercised independent judgment not to invoke a MAC
consistent with the government‟s reasoning to proceed with closing the
merger; or (3) the board lacked independence and simply acquiesced to the
government‟s demand.
Negotiations ethics aside, the first decision advanced the Bank‟s
financial health. The second decision would be an independent, informed
business judgment, which may or may not have resulted in net financial
harm to the company. These decisions would be entitled to the protection of
the business judgment rule. The third decision would be tainted for lack of
independence. The board would have rubber stamped a government order.
However, the resulting decision would not be automatically void. Section
204
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144(a)(3) of the DGCL shields a transaction or contract from voidability if
it “is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or
ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.” 211
Where there is a loyalty problem, the presumption of the business judgment
rule does not apply and the transaction is actively scrutinized for fairness.212
The fairness inquiry would fail for lack of an injury.213 The board‟s
decision to close the deal was proper for the simple reason that there was no
choice. Intentional or not, Lewis and the board incorrectly asserted the
legality of invoking the MAC. Terminating or renegotiating the deal would
have led to the losing side of a lawsuit. Such action would have damaged
the financial market with adverse consequences on both firms.214 The board
would have run the risk of alienating the government and diminishing the
company‟s ability to access financial aid, at least with the current board and
management still in place. Whether or not the board was unduly influenced,
its decision turned out to be fair and advanced the best interest of the
company. This could be the unusual case in which the board took the
correct action because it was disloyal. A plausible motive for attempting to
invoke a weak case for a MAC was a desire to remedy a poorly executed
and negotiated merger by renegotiating the merger consideration. This illadvised legal strategy to fix a prior wrong could have produced an even
worse outcome for the company. The government, acting in the best
interest of the public welfare, forced the correct board action, an outcome
possible only when the interests of the public and the corporation are
aligned and a risky possibility of increasing the shareholder‟s pecuniary
stake potentially conflicts with these interests.
What do we conclude from this case study? Legally, liability under
Delaware corporate law is unlike because of exculpation for any duty of
care violations, and because there simply was no injury to shareholders
under an assumption that their vote for the merger was not tainted by faulty
disclosure. More broadly, the case study reveals that there is a real
possibility, though unlikely given the available facts, that shareholders
“took a bullet” in terms of assuming large short-term losses to avoid the
injection of more systemic risk into a crippled financial system, and that the
company‟s management and board, prompted by government entreaties,
were motivated in part at least to advance the public‟s interest in stabilizing
a financial crisis over the shareholder‟s immediate pecuniary interest. This
211
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recital of the facts, currently known as of the writing of this Article, is
important to show the contextual color of the regulatory and corporate
decision making. This case study reveals an important aspect of corporate
governance that thus far has not had an opportunity to be analyzed: that is,
corporate governance is not always a purely private affair, but instead can
be a public-private coordinated decision in times of national crisis or
systemic risk.
II.

FIDUCIARY DUTY ISSUES

A.

Statutory Authority to Promote Public Welfare

The case study in Part I shows that the Bank had no choice but to
assume the heavy financial loss accumulating by Merrill under the terms of
the merger agreement. In this second topical section, presented in Parts II
through IV, this Article discusses the theoretical issues raised by the role of
corporations in public crises. To contextualize the problem, I assume that
the Bank could have terminated the deal on the basis of a legally viable
material adverse change. Under this counterfactual, the Bank would have
been uniquely situated to rescue the financial market by foregoing its legal
option to avoid Merrill‟s losses. This episode shows the real possibility that
a board may someday confront the Hobson‟s choice between maximizing
shareholder wealth and protecting the public welfare or wealth. I consider
in this second topical section the theoretical dimensions of this
counterfactual and provide a framework for analyzing fiduciary obligations.
The counterfactual scenario has a predicate: would the Bank have
financially gained if it had exercised a legal right to terminate the merger?
This is impossible to answer. We will never know what would have
happened, counterfactuals being what they are. Simply put, the answer
requires an informed business judgment during great market uncertainty.
Lewis, Bernanke, and Paulson agreed that the Bank would not have been
immune from the market fallout of Merrill‟s collapse.215 There would have
been indirect, immeasurable harm from further market turmoil if the Bank
cut Merrill loose, and this cost must be weighed against the more direct,
measurable, and enormous financial harm from mooring Merrill‟s liabilities
to the Bank‟s balance sheet. Even with a sound legal right to terminate the
deal and without a government threat overhanging its decision, the Bank
may have been better off by not invoking a MAC. An informed board
decision made in good faith would have been protected by the business
judgment rule even if the outcome is ultimately terrible.
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Importantly, standard corporate law rules may suffice to deal with
extraordinary circumstances. Courts could invoke the elision that a board‟s
decision to assume an enormous financial loss may have some abstract
“long-term” benefit,216 a Potemkin explanation routinely invoked to shield
business judgment from active scrutiny of the merit of ill-advised, stupid or
erroneous decisions in furtherance of legitimate jurisprudential reasons.217
A board‟s decision to assume enormous financial loss by voluntarily
rescuing another firm may be valid on the ground that the long-term interest
of a stable financial market is in the best interest of the corporation and
shareholders as well, 218 similar to the way that the quality of the
neighborhood surrounding Wrigley Field was supposedly an important
factor in the baseball team‟s decision not to install lights in Shlensky v.
Wrigley.219 Much of the legitimacy of corporate law, which gives managers
great authority over corporate assets, depends on plausible good faith.
These elisions are the white lies of corporate law, not malicious or
mendacious, but perhaps necessary to maintain a proper decorum of law
and policy.220 As long as a board does not explicitly admit that its motive
216
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was purely for the public welfare, as Henry Ford did to his legal detriment
in Dodge v. Ford, 221 courts would most likely accept the proffered
explanation, however abstract or undeveloped it may be, and avoid a
judicial decision on the merit of the board‟s decision.222 During the Merrill
acquisition, Lewis repeatedly asserted that the Bank‟s interest was
intertwined with the public interest in a sound, stable financial market.223
This assertion anticipates a legal defense, but it is undoubtedly true for a
systemically-important bank. Absent particular facts to the contrary and
with the incantation of “long-term interest of the corporation and
shareholders,” the threat of liability is whisked away by the spirit of
plausible good faith. Alternatively, the court could actively scrutinize the
decision only to find in the end that the empirical merit of the assertion
cannot be tested and thus would give dispositive weight to the plausibility
of good faith in the proffered explanation.224 The point is this: the current
framework for determining liability would allow a board to provide
enormous economic resources during a public crisis. So long as the board‟s
decision is informed and in good faith, and the explanation suggests some
nexus to a corporate benefit however abstract or unformulated it may be,
the probability of judicial scrutiny is minimized.225
If so, why is the problem of the Hobson‟s choice relevant at all? It
is relevant for instrumental, jurisprudential, and practical reasons.
that one of the three authors of this passage is former Delaware Chancellor William Allen. Previously,
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Instrumentally, a board cannot be assured that the provision of aid to the
public would fall under a duty of care and business judgment rule rubric,
but instead could be characterized as a duty of loyalty and bad faith issue
under which the directors are accused of intentionally harming the
corporation if the amount of the aid is considered wasteful. A court may
plausibly find that a board acted solely for the benefit of the public welfare
(the situation in Dodge v. Ford) and possibly impose liability for bad
faith.226 A violation of the duty of loyalty and bad faith conduct are not
subject to exculpation under section 102(b)(7), and thus expose directors to
the potential for real liability. 227 Jurisprudentially, the recognition of a
specific framework for assessing the Hobson‟s choice would reveal broader
policies and assumptions underlying corporate law. A rule of fiduciary safe
harbor, for example, would suggest that the economic returns of the factors
of production can be subjugated in limited circumstances as an aspirational
guidance. Norms serve to elicit beneficial behavior when the law cannot
mandate such conduct.228 Scholars, including former Delaware Chancellor
William Allen, have suggested that the schizophrenic scheme of imposing a
duty of care and then taking away real possibility of liability provides “the
pedagogic function of informing [board members] just what „doing the
right thing‟ means under the circumstances.”229 Practically, a real possibility
of large liability for waste or bad faith would introduce significant legal
uncertainty, which may paralyze the decision-making process during a
national crisis precisely when such paralysis could cause great harm. A
doctrine of fiduciary safe harbor would insulate boards from legal risk,
though they may still be checked by the intra-corporation political and
reputational considerations. The board‟s calculation would then revolve
around determining just what “the right thing” is under the circumstance.
With these reasons in mind, assume that a board intentionally
absorbed a large financial loss, net of all short-term and long-term, direct
and indirect factors. Ordinarily, deliberate conduct to injure a corporation,
because of either self-interest or bad faith, would obviously violate the duty
of loyalty.230 But the board took this action to avert public harm during a
national crisis with the understanding that there is a net loss, perhaps a large
226

See infra note 291 & accompanying text.
See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del. 2001).
228
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 138, at 255.
229
Id. at 257. Absent a loyalty problem, a board is protected at various levels through the business
judgment rule, section 102(b)(7) exculpation, and directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance. Id. at 25657. Legal liability for a breach of the duty of care is quite rare. Id. at 258-59.
230
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (“[W]here the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in
the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties . . . .”) (quoting In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). See also In re Caremark Int‟l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and
reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”).
227

38

one, to the corporation. The board would have intentionally inflicted
financial harm, but would there have been a foul?
Without a conflict of interest, there would be no economic rationale
for a privately-subsidized takeover, that is, an acquisition intentionally
priced in excess of the intrinsic value of the deal achievable through armslength bargaining. Such a transaction is per se irrational, and thus made in
bad faith. This raises the question of waste. A board is liable for waste
when it transfers assets for no corporate purpose or consideration.231 Waste
is a difficult standard to satisfy. It is limited to unconscionable cases where
directors irrationally squander or donate corporate assets. 232 Ordinarily,
courts will not engage in a substantive analysis of the deal: “Courts do not
measure, weigh or quantify directors‟ judgments. We do not even decide if
they are reasonable in this context.” 233 The outer boundary of the waste
inquiry is irrationality.234
If directors honestly professed a desire to subsidize a transaction
for the private benefit of target shareholders, the board would not be
entitled to the business judgment rule because the decision would not have
been in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interest of the company. The entire transaction would be subject to the
fairness standard, and it would fail this standard if the price was in fact
subsidized with no legitimate business purpose such that there is an actual
injury. Thus, there must be a source of authority allowing a board to
specifically provide corporate assets to third-parties. That source is section
122 of the DGCL, which grants corporate boards specific powers to execute
transactions that are not in the best financial interest of the corporation or
shareholders. 235 Two provisions may apply in a situation where the
company makes a substantial financial sacrifice for the benefit of the public
welfare.
Section 122(9) provides that a corporation has the power to “make
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational
purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof.”236
Because a gift is not attached to consideration, it financially harms the
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corporation.237 A donation is a gift,238 and a gift is the “act of voluntarily
transferring property to another without compensation.” 239 An acquirersubsidized takeover can be considered a donation to the target to the extent
of the subsidization.240 True, this is not the ordinary type of corporate gift,
but the uniqueness of the circumstance does not make inapposite this
provision. There is no restriction that a donation must be made to any
particular person or types of persons, but instead it must be made for some
public good.241 Thus, section 122(9) embodies the view that corporate gifts
can substantially affect the national interest.
The observation of the New Jersey Supreme Court in A.P. Smith
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, which has been cited by Delaware courts, is apposite:
During the first world war corporations loaned their personnel and contributed
substantial corporate funds in order to insure survival; during the depression of the
„30s they made contributions to alleviate the desperate hardships of the millions of
unemployed; and during the second world war they again contributed to insure
survival. They now recognize that we are faced with other, though nonetheless
vicious, threats from abroad which must be withstood without impairing the vigor of
our democratic institutions at home and that otherwise victory will be pyrrhic
indeed. . . . It seems to us that just as the conditions prevailing when corporations
were originally created required that they serve public as well as private interests,
modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as
well as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which they
operate. Within this broad concept there is no difficulty in sustaining, as incidental to
their proper objects and in aid of the public welfare, the power of corporations to
contribute corporate funds within reasonable limits in support of academic
institutions. 242

Note the references to World War I, the Great Depression, World War II,
and the Cold War, as well as the way the court linked corporate
philanthropy to national crisis and public welfare.
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Gifts cannot be justified on the basis that the corporation benefits indirectly. For instance, the New
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LAW § 202(12) (McKinney 2009).
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Id. at 757.
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consideration in money or money‟s worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded
the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the amount of
gifts made during the calendar year.”); Hooker v. Comm‟r, 174 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 1949) (“„Where
property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money‟s worth‟ the
value in excess of such consideration „shall . . . be deemed a gift.‟”) (quoting I.R.C. § 1002 (repealed
1954).
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See Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311, 316 (Del.Ch. 1956) (“[C]orporate gifts may be made solely
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A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953) (holding that a corporate donation to
Princeton University was within a company‟s corporate power). See also Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 74
(Del. Ch. 1969), aff‟d, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970) (citing Barlow and noting the similarity between
corporate gift law in New Jersey law and Delaware).
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Benefits to private actors and the public welfare are not mutually
exclusive. In the situation of a national emergency, a subsidized takeover
benefitting a private target may have a substantial public rationale. This is
the precise situation presented in the Bank‟s acquisition of Merrill. The
financial crisis of 2008 was unquestionably a “national emergency” of the
highest order, and closing the Merrill acquisition was in the public
interest.243 Without a corporate gift or contribution, taxpayers either through
TARP or some other measure may have had to pay for a rescue, or the
public may have had to bear the cost of the collapse of Merrill on the heel
of Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. At the same time, financial institutions
were receiving unprecedented financial aid from the government in an
effort to protect private wealth and public welfare. While public funds can
be used to prevent such harm, private resources can also be used when a
firm is uniquely situated to provide provide a rescue. The assumption of
portfolio diversification results in the spreading of the resources across a
broad spectrum of shareholders, 244 who through their investments have
been participants in the market activities and directly benefit from a rescue.
Distributing private assets to offset some of the burdens on the greater
society is a reason for allowing corporate gifts. As the Barlow court
reasoned, “our State has not only joined with other states in advancing the
national interest but has also specially furthered the interests of its own
people who must bear the burdens of taxation resulting from increased state
and federal aid upon default in voluntary giving.” 245 The subsidized
acquisition of Merrill would have been a private contribution from the
Bank toward the government-led effort to rescue a systemically-important
investment bank and to support a collapsing financial market.246
Section 122(9) is not an unrestricted license to the board. Delaware
courts recognize a waste limitation subject to a test of reasonableness.247 A
subsidized takeover constituting a gift to target shareholders could possibly
pass this scrutiny. 248 Importantly, the gift‟s absolute size is not
243

See supra Part I.B.
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
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dispositive.249 Other relevant factors are the size of the gift relative of the
company‟s financials,250 and the extent to which the community or public
would benefit. 251 A multi-billion dollar gift would be a stunning sum if
viewed in isolation. Yet, we should not be so astonished by a billion dollar
donation. In this era of large numbers, a billion seems to be yesterday‟s
million.252 The scale of numbers can be put in perspective by comparing it
to the state of executive compensation, which can lead to hundreds of
millions or billions of dollars in compensation to executives, 253 and yet
Delaware courts have upheld these enormous payouts as legal. 254 By
suggesting that gifts can reach the range of billions of dollars, I do not
mean to be cavalier with enormous sums of money. Rather, the separation
of ownership and control, which is an essential feature of the modern
corporation,255 allows managers great discretion to control corporate assets
without a specific, unqualified legal duty to maximize financial gain or
profit.256 It would be dissonant, to say the least, if the structure of corporate
law would allow managers to transfer enormous assets to themselves in
compensation,257 but not for an exigent social need for the many, including
the corporate enterprise itself, which always derives an indirect benefit
from a stable economy and society. The size of the gift should bear a
relationship to the severity of the crisis.258
249

Kelly, 254 A.2d at 74.
Id. at 61. In Kahn, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a settlement in which the corporation would
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In addition to the gift provision, section 122(12) empowers a
corporation to “transact any lawful business which the corporation‟s board
of directors shall find to be in aid of government authority.” 259 Whereas the
gift provision focuses on the public welfare, this section focuses on
government policy. Surprisingly, while there has been much scholarship on
corporate philanthropy,260 no Delaware court has cited or analyzed section
122(12) and scholarly attention has been scant,261 presumably because the
circumstance required to invoke this power would be most unusual.
The first observation about this provision is its broad grant of
authority. Unlike the gift provision, which refers only to power to “make
donations,” 262 section 122(12) grants authority to “transact any lawful
business.”263 The term “lawful business” is the statutory limitation on the
scope of authority, and it refers to laws outside of corporate law that may
limit, prohibit, or criminalize the contemplated corporate activity. Within
this limit, the board has the power to transact “in aid of government
authority.” The plain meaning of aid is “help given . . . tangible means of
assistance (as money or supplies).”264 The historical definition is a “subsidy
or tax granted to the king for an extraordinary purpose” as well as a
“benevolence or tribute (i.e., a sum of money) granted by the tenant to his
lord in times of difficulty and distress.”265 This etymology is meaningful in
the context of the DGCL. Under section 122(12), a board would have the
specific and broad power to make a corporation acquisition for the purpose
of aiding governmental authority during a global financial meltdown.
An expansive view of board authority is also supported by the
statutory history. Up until 1969, section 122(12) read: “In time of war or
other national emergency, [corporations are permitted] to do any lawful
business in aid thereof, notwithstanding the business or purposes set forth
in its certificate of incorporation at the request or direction of any
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DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(12) (2009); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(14) (containing a
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apparently authorized governmental authority.” 266 Several changes are
apparent. The board is no longer restricted to a “request or direction” by
government, but can instead volunteer aid.267 The new section 122(12) does
not restrict aid only to be given in “time of war or other national
emergency.”268 It also eliminated “notwithstanding the business or purposes
set forth in its certificate of incorporation.”269 This mitigates the apparent
conflict between the corporate charter and corporate statutory law, though
there would still be a tension if the corporate charter in fact contained a
prohibition against such activity. 270 The 1969 revision of section 122(12)
grants the board “full discretion to authorize any lawful business in aid of
government authority.”271
The Bank-Merrill episode shows the potential utility of section
122(12). A strong argument can be made that even if the Bank‟s board had
the option to terminate the transaction, it should not be held liable choosing
to assume the $15 billion loss, as long as the board did so to aid
government and rescue the public welfare. Moreover, the statute has
application beyond the financial crisis. Crises are a part of the human
condition. 272 Consider the following hypothetical. There is a full-blown

R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 2 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN‟S DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 122 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing 1967 version of DEL.
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formulation: “In time of war or other national emergency, a corporation may do any lawful business in
aid thereof, notwithstanding the purpose or purposes set forth in its certificate of incorporation, at the
request or direction of any competent governmental authority.” N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW. § 201(c)
(McKinney 2006).
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global flu pandemic,273 and a pharmaceutical company has the only vaccine
for this particular mutation of the flu virus. In the past year, the company
had $5 billion in net income. In light of a global pandemic, the board
decides to sell the vaccine at cost to wealthy countries and give it away to
poorer countries. The cost to the company is $1 billion in direct cost and $4
billion in lost profit opportunity. Can the board come to the aid of
government and society? While this hypothetical seems melodramatic, we
must remember that the economy and the financial market were teetering
on the verge of collapse in the fall of 2008, with unthinkable consequences
on economies around the world and the welfare of its citizens.274
B.

Fiduciary Exemption, Public Necessity, and the Tort Analogy

Since no court has spoken on section 122(12) or similar provisions
found in other state statutes, we do not know whether the board‟s authority
is bound by a legal limit. 275 The plain text of the statute suggests the
boundary, much like the gift provision, is very broad at least. Since the
government is the primary beneficiary, we may infer that the legislature
intended to grant the board great discretion in providing private aid to a
public cause. Courts would establish the appropriate standard defining the
limit. Even if corporate law is enabled by statute, it is primarily judge-made
common law in Delaware. 276 Delaware courts could import into section
122(12) a significant limit. For instance, they could construe government
aid as a form of philanthropy and impose the same waste standard
applicable to section 122(9). Similarly, section 122(15) provides that the
corporation has the power to establish compensation plans for its directors,
officers, and employees, 277 and the board‟s discretion is not unlimited in
this function, at least in theory (the Disney litigation has shown that the
board‟s discretion is extremely broad to the point where rationality almost
loses meaning).278 A limit on authority is sensible and is suggested by the
limits placed on other provisions in section 122.
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However, there are countervailing considerations. A legal limit on
section 122(12) would be problematic. First of all, the waste standard
applicable to gifts is inadequate, unless the standard as applied to a crisis is
malleable. Otherwise, it would be too restrictive under the circumstances
because the provision of assets on par with a corporate gift to a hospital or
museum, for example, may be insufficient. Recall that the Bank assumed
Merrill‟s $15 billion fourth-quarter loss; this loss may be so breathtaking
that it constitutes clear waste from the standpoint of an ordinary corporate
gift. One expects that any meaningful aid during a public crisis may be
substantial, thus automatically creating a potential legal liability for the
board if the provision of resources are commensurate with the enormity of
the stake involved. There is a potential Catch-22 absurdity: the exigency of
the situation creates a real legal risk when a board exercises the very
authority granted by statute.
The existence of legal risk raises the question of whether a board‟s
authority should be qualified or absolute. Let us first consider a limiting
principle. If there is to be one, such principle should be the foundation of
the business judgment rule, specifically an appropriate ex ante procedure
leading to an informed, good faith decision with the limit of rationality as
the outer boundary. During a national crisis, the limit of rationality would
be the point at which the board‟s decision could be said ex ante to have
financially endangered or impaired the corporation as a going concern.
Corporate endangerment, self-mutilation or suicide is not an aspirational
end of corporate law. 279 The risk of such event occurring is sufficiently
great from the acts of the unfortunate, negligent or corrupt manager, and the
law need not add to this burden. Therefore, a reasonable limiting principle
may be that the board would be irrational when it takes action knowing ex
ante that its action would impair the corporation‟s long-term financial
health as a going concern.
Although there is a strong argument for a limiting principle, this
Article proposes that there should be a fiduciary exemption when a board
determines that the firm is uniquely situated to respond to a public crisis,
and it acts under section 122(12) in “aid of government authority” or
otherwise provides aid to the public. A fiduciary safe harbor is better
because it removes legal risk from the board‟s decision involving a public
necessity. The experiences in tort law and public catastrophes have shown
that the paralyzing effect of litigation risk is real during a public crisis and
can lead to very poor outcomes.280 A small probability of liability would
279
280
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not be reassuring. Public crises may require consequential decisions with
large sums of resources at stake. A low probability, high magnitude liability
payout may still result in a significant expected value of the legal risk.
Exposure to such litigation risk may be sufficiently high to deter potentially
beneficial motive and action. The Bank-Merrill episode provides a useful
data point. As Lewis was resigning himself to the fact that the Bank had to
close the Merrill merger, he was concerned about litigation risk, so much so
that he sought a “comfort letter” from the government to use as a part of a
legal defense strategy.281 A thought that must have obviously crossed the
minds of the board and legal advisers was the impact on the liability to the
board of the government‟s coercion and a perceived decision to close the
Merrill deal based on public welfare considerations.
Authority without legal limit, which is another way to view a
fiduciary safe harbor, would be novel. In justifying this rule, I reiterate the
basic assumption that the cost-benefit of providing aid during a public crisis
would be clear. A fiduciary exemption could be seen as removing all
controls on management discretion. That is not the case. No legal limit on
authority is not equivalent to no limitation in fact. First of all, the necessity
of a public crisis limits the circumstances in which a board can act under
section 122(12) and claim fiduciary exemption. The nature of crises, being
what they are, is fairly indisputable. A private rescue would most likely be
coordinated with or at the request of the government,282 though the power to
provide aid under section 122(12) resides with the board. The notion that a
board would gin up the excuse of a public crisis as subterfuge for an illicit
asset transfer to the public, a third-party or the government is unrealistic.
One fear may be that, absent a limit on authority, a board could
impair the corporation as a going concern to promote the public welfare.
This fear is more abstract than real. Self-preservation is a powerful instinct
even when a board is acting as an agent for the legal entity.283 The moral
sentiment of a good Samaritan is limited by the perceived economic and
moral obligations to the various constituents of the corporation, including
shareholders, creditors, employees, and communities, all of whom benefit
from the firm as a going concern. Board members are also bound by their
own reputational interests, and a good deed at a ruinous cost to the
would not give directions for, or content to, the pulling down forty wooden houses . . . for
fear he should be answerable for a trespass; and in consequence of this conduct half that
great city was burnt.
Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357, 362 (Pa. 1788)..
281
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corporation would not assure a board member‟s standing among her peers
or in the corporate ballot box. Again, the Bank-Merrill episode provides a
useful reference. Upon learning of the losses accumulating at Merrill,
Lewis‟s professed instinct was to abort the deal to save the company or his
reputation. If we are to take at face value his view of events, he only
changed his mind upon being persuaded by a government with a heavy
hand of the consequences of a Merrill collapse. The instinct for market selfpreservation and personal self-interest are powerful constraints on a desire
to provide overly generous provision of aid to the impairment of the
corporate enterprise.
Another fear may be that a board could promote whatever social
agenda it may harbor under the guise of providing aid during a crisis. This
is a classic agency cost argument. This fear is also more abstract than real.
First of all, there is already authority to do this; a board can lawfully
provide gifts to promote the public welfare, and this authority is quite broad.
More to the point, just because there is a public crisis, one does not expect
that corporate boards would be indiscriminately using the crisis as an
excuse to provide large resources toward pet projects, unrelated to the crisis
and in amounts that would trigger the threat of litigation. The hypothetical
is far-fetched. For instance, the financial crisis concerned financial
institutions and, crisis or not, we do not expect firms unrelated to the crisis
to provide consequential aid. The situational context dictates that for a firm
to consider a rescue at all, it would have to be uniquely situated in relation
to the crisis. We would not expect Pfizer to rescue financial institutions
during a crisis in the financial markets, and likewise we would not expect
JPMorgan Chase to rescue the public during a global flu pandemic. A direct
causality would connect corporate munificence. The uniqueness of a firm‟s
situation in relation to the public crisis provides a natural, extra-legal
constraint on board action.
There is also a pragmatic political reason for fiduciary exemption.
The primary threat to state corporate law is federal intervention.284 What if
state corporate law undermined federal policy by deterring corporate
cooperation with government policy or punishing corporate boards with
liability when the dust settles? To the extent that state law would impose a
limitation on a corporation‟s ability to aid federal policy during a national
crisis, the federal government may intervene and enact corporate law
consistent with the federal government‟s regulatory goals (Part IV, infra,
discusses this issue in greater depth).
Mark J. Roe, Delaware‟s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 604 (2003). See Griffith, supra note
118, at 54 & n.222 (“And if the federal government passes legislation or regulations moving corporate
law, in whole or in part, into the federal sphere, the authority of the Delaware judiciary over those
matters is effectively preempted.”) (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977)).
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Based on the above reasons, a rule of fiduciary exemption is more
sensible. The rule is simply stated: upon a public necessity, a board of a
firm that is uniquely situated to avert or mitigate a public crisis is exempt
from its ordinary fiduciary duty to the corporation insofar as it distributes
corporate assets with the intent to aid the government or the public.
The theoretical justification for fiduciary exemption can be found
in a well established doctrine of tort law dealing with public crisis and
necessity. As a prefatory matter, I note that corporate law borrows much of
its concepts of duty and standard of liability from tort law.285 The analogy to
tort law is a natural one. Tort law concerns legal wrongs as primarily
determined through case-by-case adjudication, and this common law
process defines the parameters of the standards of conduct constituting
one‟s obligation not to harm others. The most obvious application of tort
law principles is a director‟s duty of care, which defined in terms of a cause
of action for negligence. 286 Of course, the analogy is imperfect. The
exceptional aspect of corporate law is that for policy reasons directors are
protected through various devices such as the business judgment rule and
exculpation under section 102(b)(7) for monetary damages. 287 But these
devices are corporate law‟s overlay on top of the fundamental principles of
duty and fault.
The tort analogy does not stop at the concept of negligence. The
duty of loyalty resembles concepts in tort law. Classic conflict of interest
transactions and expropriation of assets find their doctrinal roots, in part at
least, in the civil wrongs of conversion and fraud. Tort law recognizes
special causes of action such as insurance bad faith,288 and more generally it
provides a framework for assessing liability based on a level of scienter
falling below some hostile purpose or motive. For instance, it defines
See Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 118, at 1301 (“Thus, claimed breaches of the duty
of care were essentially subjected to traditional tort analysis, i.e., whether the duty was violated, and if
so, whether the violation caused harm to the corporation or the shareholders, and the burden of proof fell
upon the plaintiff.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U.
PITT. L. REV. 945, 945 (1990) (“The duty of care of corporate directors and officers is a special case of
the duty of care imposed throughout the law under the general heading of negligence.”); EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, supra note 244, at 93 (analogizing the fiduciary principle to tort law).
286
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“intent” in intentional torts to include substantial certainty of the outcome
though the actor may not have desired the outcome.289 Below this level of
scienter is recklessness, which is defined as when an actor knows or has
reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that
his act or intentional omission not only creates an unreasonable risk of
harm, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is
needed to meet the negligence standard.290 These gradients of culpability
are analogous to those applied in corporate law. For instance, under
Delaware law, bad faith conduct by the board resulting in harm to the
corporation is a subset of a violation of the duty of loyalty.291 A director can
be found liable for failure to monitor if “he has recklessly reposed
confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has refused or
neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored either
willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee
wrongdoing.”292 Consider the Caremark formulation of liability based on
“sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight,”293 which
implies deliberate disregard of substantial risk of a bad outcome. The
formulation for bad faith in Disney is “intentional dereliction of duty, a
conscious disregard for one‟s responsibilities,”294 which is a particularized
standard of reckless behavior. These statements of culpability are derivative
of tort standards, though they are embellished with a corporate law twist,
meaning that residual ambiguity in the standard leaves much interpretive
discretion to courts.295
The influence of tort law is seen even in the realm of takeover law.
It is apparent that the law of self-defense informs Delaware‟s standard for
289
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reviewing the appropriateness of a board‟s adoption of antitakeover
defenses. Under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 296 the target has the
burden to establish that the board reasonably perceived that the hostile
takeover bid was a threat to the corporation, and the takeover defensive
measure adopted was reasonable in response to the threat.297 This standard
is analogous to the tort standard, which provides that self-defense measures
cannot be “in excess of that which the actor correctly or reasonably believes
to be necessary for his protection.”298 In both circumstances of self-defense,
there must be a reasonable perception of a threat met with a response that
must be commeasure with the threat level.
It is fair to suggest that tort law informs the liability scheme of
corporate law as the two bodies of law fundamentally concern wrongful
conduct and liability therefrom, though obviously applications and policies
may differ, perhaps substantially so, in the details. If tort law is a reference
point, if not as the pole star, for the liability framework of corporate law, it
may prove useful in analyzing a board‟s liability for financial harm arising
from a private sacrifice of corporate profit or assets. Specifically, the tort
doctrine of public necessity provides a theoretical justification for fiduciary
exemption.
In tort law, the defense of necessity is treated differently depending
on whether the necessity is a private or public need. Private necessity is a
defense to an intentional tort against property, 299 but this privilege is
incomplete. Under the rule set forth in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
Co.,300 the defendant must still provide compensation for any harm done.301
A sailor has a privilege to moor his boat on another person‟s dock during a
sudden storm,302 but must pay for damage done. On the other hand, public
necessity creates a complete defense. The Restatement provides this
formulation: “One is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be
a trespass to a chattel or a conversion if the act is or is reasonably believed
to be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public disaster.”303 A public
necessity is a situation when there is a broader threat to the public wealth or
296
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welfare. The common law has long recognized this defense, which dates
back as far as 1609 to Mouse‟s Case, 304 and it states that an actor who
harms the property of another in response to a public emergency is not
liable to the property owner.305 Although this defense is generally invoked
by a public official,306 private actors can invoke it so long as the emergency
is reasonably believed to endanger the general public.307
Both private and public necessity defenses are based on efficiency
considerations. The rule of private necessity under Vincent is justified on
the basis that a private actor will not take property of another that costs
more to preserve her property. 308 The efficiency consideration of public
necessity is more apparent: the cost-benefit analysis always weighs in favor
of preserving the public welfare or wealth over private property.309 This rule
clearly satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.310 Nevertheless, the question is:
why not impose the imperfect privilege of Vincent and thus require the
delivery of actual compensation? 311 The simple answer is that the costbenefit always works in favor of mitigating a public crisis and the risk is
too great from the moment‟s hesitation by an actor who is in a position to
rescue based on the calculation of the risk of liability.312
Of course, the tort analogy is imperfect. Parties in torts are
typically related only by the accident. A corporate board is a fiduciary to
the corporation, and so there is a well-defined ex ante relationship. A fair
question is whether this prior, legally defined relationship is inalienable
thereby precluding an exemption. A fiduciary relationship should not be
considered immutable. Fiduciary duty is not an end, but a means to a
broader policy. What is that policy? According to former chancellor and
now professor William Allen, it is “the creation of economic wealth
through the facilitation of voluntary, ongoing collective action.”313 I do not
argue that Allen‟s formulation is the end of corporate law, but certainly it
(1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.) (holding that “it is lawful for any passenger to cast the things out of
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captures an important consideration. Although fiduciary duty promotes the
policy of wealth creation by mandating the board‟s fidelity to the
corporation, fiduciary exemption is consistent with the policy of wealth or
welfare maximization through collective action in the limited circumstance
of a public crisis. In the case of a public crisis, the real issue is whether or
not priority is given to wealth distribution to shareholders or the
preservation of aggregate societal wealth or welfare. The board‟s
relationship to the corporation is not solely defined by an instruction to
accumulate wealth for shareholders, which by creating residual income
tends to increase societal wealth and welfare. Aspects of corporate law
refute this narrow view. As we have seen, sections 122(9) and 122(12)
grant authority for the distribution of assets to others without consideration,
and a number of states have enacted constituency statutes that authorize the
board to consider various constituencies.314
With respect to the question of duty, tort law again provides a
useful analogy. In tort doctrine, duty does not exist in a state of nature.
Whether a duty exists is laden with policy considerations, the most famous
example of which is Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.315 The existence of
duty is a legal question, and courts “fix the duty point by balancing factors,
including the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally . . .
and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of
liability.”316 This jurisprudential method is not limited to the realm of torts.
Delaware courts have applied a similar policy-based analysis to shift
fiduciary duty to creditors in insolvency (as discussed further in Part III). 317
The recognition of a limited exemption is the next iteration in the
development of a fiduciary framework based on a broad goal of social
wealth or public welfare maximization arising from voluntary, collective
action. A fiduciary safe harbor may be justified if the underlying policy is
sufficiently compelling and consistent with the broader goals of corporate
law. Public necessity and the cost-benefit of a rescue, this Article argues,
meet this criterion to justify a fiduciary safe harbor for a corporate board
and thus eliminate legal risk from the board‟s consideration when the threat
to the public is grave.
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III.

SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IN CRISIS

While the legal issues concerning the Bank board‟s actions can
probably be resolved in litigation without breaking new ground, the episode
and the permutations of counterfactuals expose a recurring, fundamental
tension in corporate law. What is the purpose of the corporation and more
generally business? The answer to this question depends on one‟s
conception of the firm and view of shareholder primacy.
There are two broadly defined, competing views of the firm. The
“property model” views the corporation as a collective set of contractual
rights to the production of the firm. 318 This conception is rooted in an
economic theory of the firm. Many economists and corporate law scholars,
drawing on the foundational work of Ronald Coase, 319 have argued that
corporate law can be seen “as a standard-form contract, supplying terms
most venturers would have chosen but yielding to explicit terms in all but a
few instances.” 320 Corporate law is seen fundamentally as a contractual
governance structure, providing a standard set of contractual terms from
which the parties can modify and add. 321 On the other hand, the “entity
model” views the corporation as an entity having significance independent
from the property interests of its claimants.322 An independence from the
property claims of capital providers allows the manager to consider more
broadly the interests of other constituents who do not have a formal
contractual nexus to the firm. 323 Of course, there are nuances to these
models, big and small, but an exploration of the theory of the firm is not the
purpose of this Article. For the purpose here these basic characterizations
suffice.
The two competing conceptions of the firm are at the heart of the
debate on the purpose of the corporation.324 The property model situates the
firm and corporate law squarely within the realm of private law. 325 The
entity model allows the public interest to regulate the behavior of manager
and corporate activities through corporate law.326 The property model has
strong support from academics, activist investors, and increasingly
directors, while the entity theory of the firm has support from corporate
318

See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1395, 1398-99 (1993) (describing the property and entity models of the firm).
319
R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
320
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 244, at 15.
321
Allen, supra note 312, at 1400.
322
Id. at 1402. See also Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of the Firm, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247 (1999).
323
Allen, supra note 312, at 1402.
324
Allen, supra note 220, at 264-66.
325
Id.
326
Id.

54

managers, directors, and less support in the academy. 327 As a matter of
positive theory, however, the entity model is more consistent with the
managerial concept of the corporation, which allows managers leeway to
consider nonshareholder interests: “[It] has, in fact, dominated the real
world of business and politics since the great depression.”328 According to
at least three current or former Delaware jurists, Leo Strine, Jack Jacobs,
and William Allen, who have participated in the scholarly debate, Delaware
corporate law is founded on the entity model of the corporation.329
Shareholder primacy is a logical extension of the theory of agency
cost.330 This argument constructs a principal-agent model of the firm, and
the argument goes as follows. The firm is seen as a nexus of contract
claims.331 Creditors and employees negotiate and contract directly with the
managers representing the firm, and thus they can adequately protect their
interests.332 Shareholders do not have the benefit of such explicit contracts
and yet they are the most vulnerable to risk because they hold the residual
claim.333 Corporate agents thus should be obligated to maximize profit.334
But agents, who control corporate assets, may not do this because they are
also subject to their individual interests in the firm.335 If so, it is said that an
agent held accountable to two or more principals will confront conflicting
interests in serving them and in the end these interests serve only to excuse
behavior that promotes only the agent‟s interest.336 Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel explain: “Faced with a demand from either group, the
327
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manager can appeal to the interests of the other. Agency costs rise and
social wealth falls.” 337 Fidelity to the shareholder pecuniary interest may
produce bad effects. But if a political society wishes to change the net
effects of corporate behavior, it can do so in one of two ways, by changing
either the prices of the activity or the structure of the firm.338 Given this
choice, the shareholder primacy norm requires that society should alter
economic incentives to produce the desired effects while leaving intact the
wealth-maximizing principles built into the firm.339
Any theory of the firm must recognizes the paramount importance
of economic productivity, global competitiveness, and societal wealth.340 So
pervasive are these concerns that “a more realistic and complex conception
of corporations and corporate law could successfully be advanced only if it
were premised on a plausible claim that such a model could lead to more
productive organizations in utilitarian terms.” 341 The nexus of contracts
theory (or property model) brings together the essential observations from
the economic literature: those being, that a firm is cost efficient because it
standardizes the contracting process, that agency cost should be mitigated,
and that a firm is a private economic activity and not a social cause. The
theory provides the intellectual framework for the idea that a firm should be
seen not as a public asset or a concession from the state, but is instead an
aggregate of private property rights held by constituents as specific
contractual claims on its cash flow and assets.342 In the legal academy, this
property conception of the firm has garnered the greatest support. 343
Recently, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have declared “the end
of history for corporate law” as they boldly declared the end of the debate:
“[A]s a consequence of both logic and experience, there is convergence on
a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate
social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to
shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests.”344
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The debate over shareholder primacy is the “most basic and
arguably the most persistent controversy in corporate law.”345 However, an
important aspect of this controversy has long been settled: outside of a
narrow exception limited to the takeover realm, 346 there is not a legally
enforceable obligation to maximize shareholder profit. No serious person
questions that firms should seek to earn profit through their activities, and
shareholders, being residual interest holders, most often have the most to
gain and risk. Most would accept as a starting point at least the importance
of shareholders‟ interest, perhaps a statement something along the lines of
“a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain.”347 Likewise, it is undeniable that corporate law, both statutes and case
opinions, eschews the “ruthlessly narrow focus,” 348 such as Milton
Friedman‟s famous proclamation that a corporation should “make as much
money as possible while confirming to the basic rules of the society.”349
There is not a single case or statute that states something along the lines of
“a board has a fiduciary duty to solely maximize shareholder profit in
managing the firm as a going concern.” The closest statement of a legal
obligation was made in the famous case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.:350 “A
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholder. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end.”351 But this 1919 decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, found in
most corporate law casebooks, is famous because it is an outlier.352 Under
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the business judgment rule, directors who consider stakeholder interest and
sacrifice profit, like directors who dispense with these considerations and
instead maximize profit, will be insulated from liability. 353 The persistent
controversy concerns the norm of shareholder primacy, an unenforceable
prescription that the primary purpose of a corporation should be to
maximize the shareholder‟s wealth.354
With this understanding of the theory of the firm and shareholder
primacy, the object lesson of the Bank‟s acquisition of Merrill is that the
shareholder primacy norm can conflict with the broader goal of enhancing
aggregate social welfare or wealth. It is perhaps undeniable that the
interests of the firm, shareholders, and the public are aligned in preserving
the financial markets. If, however, current shareholders could have gained
at the expense of exacerbating a financial catastrophe, a clear net loss in the
cost-benefit analysis, the board was empowered to prevent such catastrophe
by assuming private loss for the greater public gain. As a normative matter,
such expansive authority should be proper, and as a positive matter, such
authority can be found in Delaware corporate law.
This thesis is consistent with the animating principle of corporate
law—that is, corporate law is founded on the principle of social wealth
maximization. 355 This principle is not the same as shareholder profit
maximization, which at its essential level is a distributive concern. 356
Scholars have observed that there are numerous anomalies inconsistent
with the principal-agent model, and they hint at the possibility that the
prevailing model of corporate law may need a paradigm shift. 357
Shareholder primacy is a default norm only, and it can be subjugated to the
interests of other constituents. 358 For instance, many states have
constituency statutes that permit the board to consider the interests of
nonshareholder interests. 359 We have also seen two other anomalies: the
specific power to provide both gifts and government aid. Both provisions
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authorize the board to inflict financial loss on the corporation through the
provision of assets to third-parties without consideration.
There are other examples of the subordination of shareholder
primacy to a normatively superior principle. A prominent example is the
now well-established doctrine allowing a board to pivot its fiduciary
obligation from shareholders to creditors in insolvency. A board‟s fiduciary
obligation ordinarily runs to the corporation and shareholders. 360 In the
seminal case Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp.,361 Chancellor Allen articulated an exception: “At
least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board
of directors is not merely the agent of the residu[al] risk bearers, but owes
its duty to the corporate enterprise.”362 This means that the board has “an
obligation to the community of interest that sustained the corporation, to
exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximize the
corporation‟s long-term wealth creating capacity.” 363 In the vicinity of
insolvency, the shareholder interest in the firm begins to mimic the interest
of option holders in the sense that their value is increased when the
riskiness of the firm‟s cash flow increases, though such risk-taking
diminishes the overall value of the enterprise, that is, the sum of the equity
and credit claims. 364 Under these circumstances, “the corporation‟s longterm wealth creating capacity” is realized only if directors “are capable of
conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic entity.” 365
360
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Subsequently, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the principle that
fiduciary duty can shift to creditors, but modified the trigger to actual
insolvency.366 In so ruling, the court made the commonsensical observation
that “[w]hen a corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors take the place
of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of any increase in value.”367
The doctrine of fiduciary duty to creditors played an important role
in the recent financial crisis. During the negotiation over the acquisition of
Bear Stearns, Jimmy Cayne, a Bear Stearns board member, threatened to
throw the company into bankruptcy rather than accept a low bid offer from
JPMorgan Chase. 368 This “nuclear card” was a calculated game of
brinksmanship with the federal government, the stakes being either a
federal bailout of Bear Stearns, which would then remain independent, or a
collapse of the firm with potentially worldwide financial fallout.369 Among
other considerations, Cayne recognized that the claim to the primary value
of the firm resided with bondholders, who owned approximately $70 billion
of the firm‟s debt; recognizing that the coordinated JPMorgan-federal
government rescue of Bear Stearns was a bailout of creditors, he attempted
to negotiation some distribution of their value to shareholders.370 The tactic
of holding hostage the economic interest of the firm as a whole is not
unheard of,371 only the stakes here concerned the global financial market.
Ultimately, independent board members persuaded Cayne and Bear Stearns
manager that the option was unthinkable.372 Their primary concern shifted
to bondholders and other interested constituents including employees. 373
Indeed, during the board meeting to decide whether to accept JPMorgan
366
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Chase‟s acquisition offer, Bear Stearns‟s legal adviser, Sullivan &
Cromwell, advised the board that under Delaware law its fiduciary duty had
shifted to creditors and other interest groups such as employees.374 Imagine
that in the heat of the moment and in a desperate gamble to increase
shareholder wealth, the “nuclear card” was played. What would have been
the consequences on the wealth of the corporate enterprise and the welfare
of the public? The Bear Stearns episode vividly demonstrates Chancellor
Allen‟s rationale in Credit Lyonnais.
Although the concept of fiduciary duty to creditors has been
sharply criticized in scholarly literature, 375 there is a well founded, core
principle at work. Shareholder primacy is simply a default rule for social
wealth maximization. Since shareholders hold the residual economic claim
to the corporation‟s assets, director accountability as measured by
shareholder benefit has the effect of enhancing the entire value of the
enterprise as a whole economic entity. The thought is that shareholder
primacy is based on efficiency consideration. However, maximizing
shareholder value is not ipso facto a superior proposition. The proposition
fails when the shareholders‟ claim is viewed as an out-of-the-money call
option. 376 Intrinsic in the concept of shareholder value is a distributive
quality. 377 Stated simply, it is fairly obvious that shareholder wealth can
increase in only three distinct ways: (1) the total size of the wealth created
by the enterprise increases, thus leaving a greater residual claim for the
shareholders; (2) the economic pie remains the same, but shareholders take
a greater portion than other claimants; and (3) shareholders increase their
wealth by taking action that reduces the size to the economic pie, thus
diminishing the aggregate returns to other claimants.378
Only the first proposition increases social wealth and is thus a
normatively superior outcome. 379 The second proposition is neutral as to
social wealth, and the matter concerns only the equity of distribution. For
instance, if we assume that there are no externalities, society should not
care that employees of Goldman Sachs take approximately 50 percent of
net revenue of the firm and shareholders only 10 percent, such an
arrangement being the private contractual arrangement achieved among the
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factors of production.380 In these circumstances, the law generally does not
interfere in the contractual relationships establishing the distribution of the
economic pie. It is said that enterprise law provides a set of default contract
terms among factors of production. Absent fraud or some other bad motive,
the contract terms govern and market forces primarily provide the pricing
mechanism for these commercial relationships, including the market for
corporate control if the shareholder slice is less than it should be. 381 The
third proposition, a situation contemplated in Credit Lyonnais, is a clearly
inferior proposition. The notion that shareholders are made wealthy by
reducing the social wealth cannot be a desired goal. To be sure, this effect
is seen, perhaps frequently, as is the case when limited liability is used as
an ex ante liability avoidance scheme.382 Would any efficient or just society
provide a shield against liability if it had perfect information and knew
beforehand that a firm would impart social cost for which its assets cannot
pay? Such a society would be economically and morally bankrupt. A rule
promoting a reduction in the aggregate social wealth is inefficient and can
be justified only on the illicit premise that a specific class of capital
providers has an entitlement to their wealth maximization at a larger cost to
society.
The rule of fiduciary duty to shareholders reflects the view that
creditors are adequately protected through contractual agreements, fraud
and fraudulent conveyance law, implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing, bankruptcy law, general commercial law, and other creditor
rights. 383 On the other hand, shareholders can only be legally protected
through statutory corporate law and common law-based fiduciary duty.384
The fair assumption is that this scheme of legal protection for creditors and
shareholders tends to increase enterprise value, and thus fiduciary duty to
shareholders is considered a superior default norm. This assumption,
however, is only a default. As the Delaware courts have noted, there are
380
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special circumstances where shareholder profit maximization can result in
the diminished enterprise value.385 The rule of fiduciary duty to creditors
addresses the special situations where shareholders would maximize their
profit only by reducing the enterprise value of the firm.
The common principle binding the two rules of fiduciary duty is
social wealth maximization. The more accurate measure of the value of a
firm is enterprise value, the economic pie available to all capital
providers.386 Shareholder primacy is highly correlated to the principle of
wealth maximization, and this correlation is the basis for the normative
foundation of shareholder primacy. But the correlation is not perfect, and
shareholder primacy is essentially a distributive principle concerning the
return to only one class of capital providers. To the extent that the
shareholder primacy undermines the normative goal of social wealth
enhancement, that norm is subjugated.387
Another prominent principle of social wealth maximization is the
concept of limited liability. Its purpose is not to facilitate liability
avoidance and risk externalization; rather, limited liability is justified
because its many benefits outweigh the cost of risk externalization.388 These
benefits are well known.389 In short, limited liability decreases the cost of
monitoring managers and other shareholders, increases the liquidity of
shares, promotes diversification, and incentivizes managers to pursue
positive net present value projects.390 These combined effects increase the
value of the firm in several ways. They reduce agency cost and the cost of
capital.391 The cost of equity is reduced when shares are freely alienable and
there is a liquid market.392 The cost of debt is also lowered because limited
liability reduces transaction cost of credit by providing a standard default
contract term. 393 These cost savings can then be directed toward the
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economically productive activities of the firm. 394 Thus, limited liability is
economically efficient and increases social wealth.
The criterion used to determine corporate law‟s efficiency is
important. Efficiency is based on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which is
distinguished from the Pareto superior efficiency. The Pareto superior
criterion states that a change is efficient if at least one person is made better
off and no person is made worse off. 395 This criterion has few practical
applications because transactions often have third-party effects and the cost
of bringing about compensation may often exceed the net surplus. 396 In
contrast, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency provides that a change is efficient if
gainers gain more than the losers lose.397 The important concept is that in
principle the gainers could compensate the losers and still enjoy a surplus,
but compensation is not required.398 “In other words, efficiency corresponds
to „the size of the pie,‟ while equity has to do with how it is sliced.”399 This
is essentially a cost-benefit analysis, 400 which has greater practical
application than the Pareto superior criterion. Thus, Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency “has become a standard tool for evaluating enterprise law.”401
A cost-benefit analysis is the governing principle of corporate
law.402 Society has a normative preference for greater aggregate wealth.403
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion provides a simple, compelling animating
principle for the default norm of shareholder primacy, the pivot of fiduciary
duty to creditors, and the rule of limited liability. These rules tend to
increase social wealth: shareholder primacy, because it directs managers to
create residual profit; fiduciary duty to creditors, because shareholders are
incentivized to destroy firm value when their economic claim resembles an
out-of-the-money call option rather than a true residual claim; limited
liability, because it creates value even though it externalizes the cost of
torts. Together, these doctrines constitute a coherent picture that
shareholder primacy, like the business judgment rule, is merely a
presumption, albeit a fairly strong one. 404 The distributive principle of
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shareholder primacy is not the end of corporate law, but is instead a default
setting because in most cases profit maximization nicely correlates to
increased social wealth.405 The default setting can change when the social
cost-benefit calculus changes. In the face of clear evidence of the threat of
abnormally large social harm associated with a national crisis, the board
can subjugate shareholder primacy, which even in normal times is an
unenforceable norm, to directly advance the societal interest preventing or
mitigating such harm.
The financial crisis of 2008 teaches us that the cost-benefit analysis
does not always weigh in favor of private financial gain. Indeed, much of
its causality can be explained by the pursuit of short-term private gain by
employees, managers, and vicariously passive shareholders of the many
firms responsible for the crisis.406 In ordinary circumstances, the framing of
shareholder primacy is not at issue, and we correctly assume that the profitmaximizing firm with its embedded distributive principle generally tends to
enhance social wealth and welfare because the legal process is ill-suited to
engage in an individualized assessment of the cost-benefit and distribution
of surplus to the various participants and constituents.407 The rising tide of
shareholder wealth lifts all boats, it is correctly assumed as the default
aspiration. The incentive structure underlying profit maximization works
most of the time in ordinary circumstances.408 This default setting, however,
should not diminish society‟s greater interest in the protection of the
financial markets and the national economy, or the public good more
generally in time of great crises. These interests can outweigh the narrow
financial interests of any single firm since a sound economy and market are
preconditions to the long-term health of the company.
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The specific set of complex considerations confronted by the
Bank‟s board was not the first. Consider the assessment of Jamie Dimon,
JPMorgan Chase‟s CEO, regarding the Bear Stearns acquisition.
The import of this massive direct intervention to save a securities firm from
failing was historic. Yet there was little choice, the key participants felt at the time,
“People were saying, „you have to save them, you‟re JPMorgan!‟” Dimon
remembered. “It was a wise thing to do . . . JPMorgan should not stand in the way of
doing something good because we‟re being selfish or parochial.” He later clarified
his thinking. “My perspective, from the start,” Dimon explained, “was that we could
not do anything that would jeopardize the health of JPMorgan. That would not be
good for our shareholders and it would not be good for the financial system. But I
also felt that, to the extent it was consistent with the best interests of shareholders,
we‟d do everything we reasonably could to try to prevent the systematic damage that
the Bear Stearns failure would cause. We and the whole board—we, the management
team, and the whole board of the company—viewed that as an obligation of
JPMorgan as a responsible corporate citizen.”409

To be sure, this comment may be self-promoting, but also it also illustrates
candor by a CEO who was in a position of awesome responsibility during a
national crisis. We see in this nuanced, perhaps conflicting, comment that
the consideration of a board and management during a financial crisis was a
simplistic “What is good for shareholders?”, but instead can be broader to
include the perceived responsibility of a corporate citizen in a unique
position to rescue a financial system. For a systemically-important financial
institution, its interest in profit and society‟s interest in a sound market are
intertwined; the board usually has the authority within the sphere of
business judgment to weigh such a matter and decide accordingly without
its decisions becoming subject to active judicial scrutiny. The alignment of
interest, however, is certainly not perfect. There certainly could be
situations when shareholder pecuniary interest conflicts with greater
interest in social wealth and welfare. In these cases, the superior principle is
one of maximizing the social wealth.
While Delaware law cannot mandate the pursuit of the public
welfare, just as it cannot mandate shareholder profit maximization, without
encroaching on the board‟s prerogative to manage the corporation, it leaves
the board with great leeway to do precisely that. The business judgment
rule protects board action within the bounds of rationality, and the board
can rely on such half-fictional, abstractized reasoning as pursuing the
“long-term” interest of the corporation and shareholders. Additionally,
Delaware law provides broad flexibility in terms of the provision of
corporate assets in times of national crisis through sections 122(9) and
122(12) of the DGCL. In crisis, fiduciary duty and board authority are
elastic concepts sufficient to encompass the promotion of the public welfare
409
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as the primary objective of action. Accordingly, the liability scheme should
reflect this.
Despite the sometimes ideological nature of the defense of
shareholder primacy, we also see that corporate decision making is much
more complex than can be served by unconditional, bright-line rules or
canons of economic or political philosophy. The Bank-Merrill episode is
instructive. The Bank‟s board had many things to consider before
determining whether to complete the merger with Merrill, including the
potential harm to the financial markets and the public welfare in time of
great crisis. This is no small consideration, and a systemically-important
financial institution should have important obligations toward the
soundness of the financial system. In this regard, the government acting
through Paulson and Bernanke made sure that the board fully considered all
important factors in its decision.
Lastly, the financial sacrifice made by the Bank under the “taking a
bullet” scenario must be considered in the broader political and social
context in which even a corporation must navigate. Consider these
indisputable facts: financial institutions received unprecedented public aid
during the financial crisis; 410 these firms bear a large responsibility for
bringing about the financial catastrophe; inside these firms, many managers
and employees are given large slices of the economic pie without any
serious limitations imposed by corporate law, and such disbursements are
made even when this class of professionals bears a large responsibility for
the financial crisis. It is said that “legitimate political questions about, for
example, the social distribution of wealth fall outside of the competence of
corporate law.”411 Yet, it would be an odd result of corporate law and our
economic organization more broadly if corporate law is silent on whether
these institutions can take voluntary action to save a financial system that
begets the opportunity to create such vast wealth for their managers and
employees as well as the broader society.
Consider a counterfactual scenario in which the Bank terminated its
merger with Merrill, and thus exacerbated a financial market crash. In
seeking to defend their action, Lewis and board announce in a press release
that “the board acted consistent with its fiduciary duty to shareholders to
protect their economic interests,” or this idea becomes the public perception.
A corporation‟s action to increase shareholder wealth irrespective to the
410
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cost to society could have been the type of conscience-raising event that
may trigger consequential backlash, like the accounting scandals at Enron
and WorldCom that prompted the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(“SOX”).
Shareholder primacy has little role in the government‟s policy
decision making. Even when the government is an investor in a bailout, it is
myopic to believe that such public funds are deployed for the primary
benefit of the shareholders in the firm. Any benefit to shareholders from
government action was incidental toward the larger goal of stabilizing a
collapsing economy. In a crisis, larger issues can be at stake than the wealth
of shareholders. As discussed above, the board of a financial institution
could also legitimately take a similar view. A board would have been well
within its authority to consider the public welfare as the primary, albeit
temporary, end of corporate action. Strong proponents of shareholder
primacy would have little moral ground to stake an opposition. During the
financial crisis, an unprecedented amount of public funds were deployed to
support financial institutions. It is not so farfetched for a board to explicitly
recognize a quid pro quo. In a national crisis, the provision of public funds
may be advanced to benefit corporations, and similarly corporate resources
can be deployed for the benefit of the public welfare, notwithstanding
financial harm to the corporation and shareholders.
IV.

POLITICS OF CRISIS AND GOVERNANCE

During national crises and in a federalist system like ours, the
federal government has the primary obligation to address or coordinate the
government‟s response. Such response may include using federal resources,
as well as coordinating the activities of others such as state and local
governments, citizens, and perhaps even corporations. In this respect, the
Bank-Merrill episode teaches a historic lesson: that is, while acting through
its supervisory authority, the federal government can temporarily control
the board‟s function if it perceives that the board is potentially
malfunctioning during a national crisis. This fact has important implication
on the future design of substantive federal regulation of important
industries, such as the financial, energy, pharmaceutical, and technology
sectors.
In recent years, the federal-state dichotomy in corporate law has
garnered much scholarly attention. 412 For instances, Lucian Bebchuk and
412
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Assaf Hamdani have argued that state competition for corporate law
inadequately protects investors and that a comprehensive, systematic
review of federalization is needed.413 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have
argued that the federal-state relationship is symbiotic, and that the federal
government intervenes in state law only in times of systemic change from
significant populist sentiments.414 Mark Roe has argued that Delaware law
is subordinate to federal authority, so much so that it promotes federal
policy, express or implied, or is otherwise preempted by federal law as was
the case with the SOX.415
Corporate law is as much a product of political calculation as it is
of legal and economic deliberation.416 Despite the divergence of opinions on
the federal-state relationship and the federal preemption trigger, the
ultimate power resides with the federal government as the entire field can
be preempted.417 State corporate law is not constitutionally guaranteed.418 If
state law undermines federal policy, state governments expose themselves
to federal preemption,419 something Delaware must consider.420
The failure of private corporate conduct during crises to promote
national policy could be considered a failure of corporate law if the law is
perceived to be a hindrance toward cooperation and assistance. For instance,
assume that the Bank held the stability of the global financial system in its
hands and it chose, per its legal right, to protect its parochial economic
interest at the cost of triggering a collapse of the financial system and great
harm to the national economy. Subsequently, documents are produced that
the Bank engaged in a “Ford Pinto”-type cost-benefit analysis in justifying
the board‟s decision. What would be the consequences on the company, its
board and management, and the financial industry sector? An appropriately
outraged public and government may result in corrective legislation as was
the case with the SOX, which was enacted in response to the accounting
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and other corporations. Private corporate
governance cannot be insulated from public crisis management.
413
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In the Bank-Merrill episode, the government executed a temporary,
indirect public takeover of corporate governance function when it appeared
that the board would undermine federal policy. 421 The legal mess and
increased systemic risk arising from an attempt to terminate the merger
would have, in the words of Paulson, exhibited “a colossal lack of
judgment.” 422 It was fortunate that this temporary, indirect takeover of
board governance was possible because the federal government had the tool
of bank supervisory authority. If the supervisory authority did not extend to
a credible threat to fire the board and the management, the situation could
have devolved to a board malfunction, and worse, the injection of more
systemic risk into a badly damaged financial market.
Since the Merrill acquisition successfully closed, we are left with
the question of whether a means of direct federal intervention in corporate
governance is needed. The answer depends in part on whether the board
would be found liable for its action. If liability arises from the board‟s
decision not to exercise the MAC, whether the option was viable or not,
such liability would introduce uncertainty in future crises. The decision
under state law would in effect undermine the authority of federal
regulators and the legitimacy of their actions. In the next national crisis,
rather than engaging in a cooperative relationship with the government, the
board may exploit the crisis to pursue a narrow financial interest
irrespective of any consequences to the public welfare, or at least it may be
reluctant to make a sacrifice on behalf of the public welfare.
This possibility was openly discussed during congressional
testimonies of Bernanke and Paulson. The potential for federal intervention
in corporate law has already been recognized in congressional hearings.
The following exchange between Bernanke and Representative Bill Foster
is illustrative.423
Q. [Do] you believe that there are circumstances in which the CEO of a systemically
important firm might be expected to have his shareholders take a bullet, to protect
the overall health of the economy, in a crisis situation?
A. No, that‟s not—that‟s not appropriate under supervisory practice. And we have
not done that.
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Q. Okay. And so do you believe that there is any need for any additional legal clarity
about duties, of a CEO, to the shareholders, to the regulators and to the overall
economy, in times of systemic crisis?
A. Well, that might be something for Congress to consider. But I think the rules as
they currently stand are quite clear, that you can‟t force somebody to take actions,
against the interest of their own company, for systemic reasons alone.424

Bernanke and Foster acknowledged that state corporate law may be
ambiguous as to the fiduciary duty of the board and officers during a public
crisis. Also, Bernanke‟s testimony must be parsed. The government‟s
supervisory authority over financial institutions under federal banking law
did not encompass forcing a company to make a financial sacrifice. This
must be distinguished from the board‟s authority under state corporate law
to take such action, and he left open the possibility of a federal safe harbor
if the legal point is not already clear in state corporate law.
During Paulson‟s testimony, Representative Foster again inquired
into the possibility of a federal safe harbor, and Paulson answered that “the
more legal clarity we have the better” and that the issue while “very
complicated . . . is certainly one I think that bears consideration.”425 Later in
his testimony, in response to the question of whether the government can
fire the management and board of a bank, Paulson commented further:
I have an understanding that under unusual circumstances, if the Federal Reserve is
dealing with a regulated entity and that there are decisions made at that regulated
entity that endangers the safety and soundness of that institution, then the Fed has the
authority to hold them accountable. Now, clearly in terms of corporate governance
101, we have—you know, we know how boards are selected and we know that
boards select management. But there needs to be something for regulated entities
where the regulators can protect the safety and soundness.426

Here, again, another federal regulator who was at the front line of the
financial crisis expressed his view that greater clarity of board obligation
and perhaps greater regulatory authority to elicit corporate cooperation may
be needed through federal legislation.
The testimonies of Bernanke and Paulson suggest that there may be
potentially counterproductive ambiguities in the understanding of a board‟s
duty in times of crisis, and potential conflicts between the government‟s
obligation to protect the public welfare and the board‟s duty under state
corporate law. The Bank-Merrill episode bears this out. Only a legally
unviable option to terminate the merger averted a true Hobson‟s choice
between shareholder profit and public wealth and welfare. Banking
supervisory authority was sufficiently broad to ensure that the board did not
424
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malfunction by selecting a legally reckless stratagem. In the future, the
happenstance of the existence of regulatory power may be absent.
This leaves Delaware with an essential political calculation. If state
corporate law is perceived to be inadequate, Congress may need to enact a
federal safe harbor because private industry cooperation may be essential to
advance important government and public welfare objectives in time of
crisis. As discussed in Part II.B., a theory of fiduciary exemption can be
justified by public necessity. Public necessity is a defense to a voluntary act
of destruction or injury to property in response to a public crisis. It does not
obligate the rescue of a person or situation.
Legislation can be more aggressive and may require a duty to
rescue, at least among certain key industry sectors such as the financial,
energy, technology, and pharmaceutical sectors. Here, there is another
useful tort analogy. The general rule in tort law is that there is no duty to
rescue.427 Only when there is a special relationship will courts sometimes
impose an affirmative duty to rescue.428 The implication of these rules on
corporate law is clear. It is inconceivable that state corporate law, either
through statute or judicial ruling, would impose a duty to rescue the
government or the public in a crisis. The duty to rescue is inconsistent with
the philosophy of personal autonomy and liberty, 429 and it would be
inconsistent with the view of the corporation as primarily an aggregation of
property rights.
To be clear, I do not advocate an affirmative duty to rescue. A shift
from an informed, voluntary action of a board to a legal mandate for a
rescue would swing the pendulum too far in favor of sacrificing private
property for the public welfare. This is philosophically unpalatable. My
theory of fiduciary exemption is based on the premise that a corporate
board should and does have great authority to make informed decisions
with the interest of all constituents in mind, including the greater public
wealth and welfare, and this authority should be unchecked by legal
constraints during the limited circumstance of a public crisis in which the
firm is uniquely situated to avert a far greater harm at the cost of a private
sacrifice. I simply raise the issue of a duty to rescue because it is not
inconceivable that federal legislation could mandate a duty to rescue. The
conditions necessary to enact the legislation would be a conscience-raising
event during a public crisis, such as a “Ford Pinto”-type cost-benefit
analysis or the mass perception of it. Additionally, certain companies or
427

See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that there is no duty to rescue a
drowning man).
428
See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 351 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a
psychiatrist has a duty to warn the intended victim of a violent crime potentially perpetrated by his
patient).
429
Epstein, supra note 302, at 198-203.

72

industries must be perceived to have a special relationship to the public
welfare, and some obvious candidates are the financial, energy, technology,
and pharmaceutical sectors.
CONCLUSION
The affairs of the corporation are considered private activity. The
prevailing concept of the firm is a nexus of private contract rights among
participants in an economic enterprise. These assertions undoubtedly have a
certain descriptive power about them, but very little in law is categorical or
axiomatic. In time of crisis, corporate activity can take the form of publicprivate activity, or at least it can impart significantly greater effects on
social wealth and public welfare. In these situations, the normal rules do not
apply. Just to be clear, this Article does not advocate corporate suicide or
self-mutilation even as an aspirational matter. Crisis or not, there should be
no such principle in corporate law requiring the impairment of a going
concern. The thesis here is that there should be an exemption from the
fiduciary principle when a board pursues the public good over the private
gain on a temporary basis when the firm is uniquely situated to avert or
mitigate a public crisis. If the cost-benefit analysis on a broader level is
obvious, a board should be allowed to provide aid to the public without
legal risk overhanging its decision.
The theory of fiduciary exemption may be controversial to strong
proponents of shareholder primacy, but more radical, in my view, is a legal
rule requiring a board to pursue private economic gain at a tremendous
direct cost to society given the Hobson‟s choice when a board can avoid
such cost through the provision of aid. In light of the unprecedented rescue
of the private sector with public funds during the financial crisis, as may be
expected when markets fail or a public crisis ensues, a legal rule that
jeopardizes or deters a voluntary rescue would be morally suspect given the
nexus of social relationships and the expectation of reciprocity of aid,
which were evident in the financial crisis.
I am also comforted by two thoughts. First, the animating principle
of corporate law is the maximization of social wealth and welfare, and not
the more narrow interest of shareholder profit, which is essentially a
distributive principle. In time of crisis, the benefit to the public may be so
large and obvious that the presumption of shareholder primacy is clearly
rebutted by the potential harm. The cost-benefit analysis may permit a
primary obligation to consider the public good. Second, we are left with the
plain fact that amidst a real, immediate, truly national economic crisis,
shareholder pecuniary interest did in fact become rather incidental. It was
clear at the time that the board of the Bank had many other considerations
in its deliberation than shareholder profit maximization. In this episode, the
legal relevance of the board‟s motivation may be moot because the

73

company may not have had a contractual option to avoid financial loss, but
it shows how corporate decision making cannot be reduced to the mandate
of enhancing firm value during a public crisis.
The real world can be more complex than the abstractions of
principles or dogma devoid of context. Even if it could be shown that the
Bank‟s shareholders would have financially gained from terminating the
Merrill acquisition, the board would have been well within its authority to
close the deal when the harm to the public‟s interest would have been great,
and it should be allowed to do so publicly and without resort to such
disingenuous elision as the “long-term interest of the corporation and
shareholders.” Such honesty may have the positive effect of recognizing
that the corporate enterprise is integrated into the fabric of society rather
than a separate, discrete nexus of contracts removed from the surrounding
context and designed solely to maximize value for the residual claimant.
Under the circumstance of a national crisis, courts should not penalize a
board for acting in the interest of the public welfare as a matter of the
practical politics between state and the federal governments, lest there be a
potential federal response in the form of greater federal control of corporate
governance either directly through a federal safe harbor or indirectly
through the grant of more power to regulators.
The financial crisis of 2008 will not be the only national crisis. We
can expect large crises in the future, though how they manifest is
unpredictable. Perhaps the next crisis will be a large scale war, another
economic collapse, a pandemic, or a large natural catastrophe. In these
situations, the social wealth and public welfare should not be sacrificed
upon the altar of shareholder primacy. Faith therein has its limits. Stated
more bluntly, let us isolate the problem to its pure essence. Recall the
hypothetical of the pharmaceutical company that sacrifices billions of
dollars of profit in the face of a global flu pandemic and the resources of
government is limited. The decision whether to sacrifice profit or take a
financial loss is premised on three questions. First, can the board do this
within current construct of corporate law? Yes, such authority is a part of
the corporate contract. Second, should the board have the power to do this?
Absolutely, along with the government, the corporation is the only entity
that can muster enormous resources of society to aid in time of great crisis.
Third, should the board do this? There is no easy answer. This is a business
judgment of the board, absent some federal mandate through substantive
regulation. In making this judgment, the board may take into account moral
considerations, the exigencies of the human condition, and the common
obligation of all members of society to care for each other on some
essential level, in addition to the consideration of profit. In this difficult
circumstance, such decisions based on public necessity are so great that the
calculus should be free of legal risk. Thus, in a time of national crisis, the
shareholder primacy norm can and sometimes does fail the stress test.

74

